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LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT: 
THE MEANING OF BAKER V. CARR 
Jo Desha Lucas* 
IN three recent cases the Supreme Court has reopened the ques-tion of the extent to which federal courts will review the 
general fairness of state schemes of legislative apportionment. It 
is a question on which the Court has had nothing to say for over 
a decade, leaving the bar to patch together the current state of 
the law from the outcome of cases disposed of without opinion 
considered against a backdrop of language used in earlier decisions. 
I. BAKER v. CARR 
In Baker v. Carr1 there was full atonement for past laconism. 
There were six opinions, totalling some 50,000 words, and the 
case was returned to the district court with an order to hear it 
on the merits, suggesting that there are more to come. A simple 
theme has not undergone such exhaustive exploration since the 
publication of Beethoven's "Thirty-three Variations on a Waltz 
by Diabelli." 
Baker was a suit brought in a three-judge district court seek-
ing a declaration that the retention in 1961 of the scheme pro-
vided by the Tennessee Legislative Apportionment Act of 1901,2 
contrary to provisions of the state constitution,8 violated the Con-
stitution of the United States in that it resulted in under-represen-
tation of districts of greatly increased population, thus depriving 
the residents of such districts of equal protection of the laws.4 
The defendants, election officials of the state of Tennessee, moved 
to dismiss on three grounds: first, want of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter; second, failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted; and third, absence of indispensable parties.6 The 
district court granted the motion and dismissed the bill. In a per 
curiam opinion, it conceded that the state constitution and the 
"rights" of the plaintiffs had been violated by the failure of the 
• Professor of Law, University of Chicago.-Ed. 
1 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
2 Acrs OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE ch. 122 (1901). 
3 TENN. CONST. art. II, §§ 3-6. 
~ U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
li Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
[7ll] 
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Tennessee legislature to reapportion, but, after reviewing the 
Supreme Court decisions from Colegrove v. Green6 to Matthews 
v. Handley,7 read those cases as precluding intervention on the 
part of federal courts, and went on to suggest that the case at bar 
illustrated the wisdom of the rule of non-intervention.8 Quoting 
from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Colegrove v. Green, 
the court gave other examples of political controversies into which 
the federal courts had refused to intrude.0 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court held that the question was within the subject-matter juris-
diction of the courts and was not a non-justiciable "political ques-
tion," reversing the district court and remanding the case for a 
decision on the merits of the constitutional claim.10 
Similar attempts to invalidate state statutes apportioning po-
litical influence among the state's geographically-defined political 
subdivisions had been before the Supreme Court fifteen times in 
the past thirty years, all unsuccessfully.11 To show that the dis-
trict court should try Baker v. Carr12 on the merits it was neces-
sary to dispose of these decisions. 
6 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
7 361 U.S. 127 (1959). 
8 The Court referred to earlier litigation of the same issues by the Supreme Court 
of Tennessee. See Kidd v. Mccanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W .2d 40, appeal dismissed, 
352 U.S. 920 (1956). See discussion of Kidd v. McCanless in the text infra at 736-37. 
o Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 828 (M.D. Tenn. 1959). See Colegrove v. Green, 
328 U.S. at 556. 
10 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
11 Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958); 
Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v. Mccanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956); Anderson 
v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342 
U.S. 916 (1952); Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); South v. Peters, 
339 U.S. 276 (1950); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 
U.S. 804 (1946); Cook v. Fortson (Turman v. Duckworth), 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Colegrove 
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932). It has sometimes been 
suggested that there may be a constitutionally significant distinction between cases deal-
ing with congressional apportionment and those which treat of representation in the 
state legislatures. See, e.g., Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitu• 
tion, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 329, 339-40, 344 (1962). There is language in the Frank-
furter opinion in Colegrove v. Green which lends support to this view, for there it is 
said, at 554: "The short of it is that ••. the subject has been committed to the exclusive 
control of Congress." It should be noted, however, that this language was rejected by 
Mr. Justice Rutledge, whose vote was necessary to the disposition of the case, that it 
has never been repeated by the Court, and that Colegrove v. Green was coupled with 
Colegrove v. Barrett (dealing with state representation) in disposing of MacDougall v. 
Green (dealing with presidential electors). Indeed, the distinction may be looked upon as 
an effort to distinguish Colegrove v. Green; it is highly unlikely that it will be advocated 
with much fervor in preserving the Colegrove doctrine in congressional apportionment. 
See, e.g., Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v. 
Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13 (1962). 
12 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
1963] LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 
A. The Majority Opinion: Disposing of Colegrove 
and Its Progeny 
713 
Mr. Justice Brennan, in writing the Court's majority opinion 
in which the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black joined, first 
characterized the opinion of the district court as conceding the 
violation of rights guaranteed the plaintiffs by the Constitution 
of the United States13 and proceeding upon the assumption either 
that the subject matter was not within the jurisdiction of the court, 
or that, although within the subject-matter jurisdiction, the issues 
were nevertheless political matters by their nature non-justiciable. 
After considering each of these grounds in turn, he concluded that 
both assumptions were unsupported by prior Supreme Court de-
cisions.14 
The question of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
controversy is hardly worth the discussion it has received. True,. 
there is language in the Frankfurter opinion in the Colegrove 
decision15 to the effect that the direct grant to the states to control 
the time, manner, and place of holding elections for congressmen, 
coupled with a power of revision vested in Congress and a power 
in Congress to serve as sole judge of the election of its members,16 
indicates an intention to take questions of congressional appor-
tionment out of the jurisdiction of courts of law. It is doubtful if 
this language can be taken as suggesting that apportionment prob-
lems are outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal 
courts in the sense that they are not within the constitutional 
definition of the judicial power. As Mr. Justice Clark pointed out 
ill Baker v. Carr,17 Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Justices who 
signed his Colegrove opinion first held that the dispute was gov-
erned by Wood v. Broom,18 and in Wood the Supreme Court had 
not questioned the jurisdiction, but on the contrary had reversed 
the district court on the merits. In any event, the matter has often 
been litigated without serious doubt as to jurisdiction. After all, 
the claim is that the equal protection clause prohibits geographical 
discrimination in the allocation of representatives in the state leg-
islature. That such a claim is within the subject matter committed 
to the Court seems beyond dispute. 
13 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 197. 
14 Id. at 237. 
15 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
16 Id. at 554. 
17 369 U.S. at 252. 
18 287 U.S. l (1932). See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. at 551. 
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As to the justiciability of the questions, the easy answer is 
that in several cases such matters have been adjudicated and de-
cided upon the merits. Again, there is language to the contrary 
in the Frankfurter opinion in Colegrove, and language in South 
v. Peters19 which could be taken as indicating that the issues were 
non-justiciable, but the stark fact stands out that in MacDougall 
v. Green20 a very similar issue was adjudicated, and the disposition 
of causes in several other cases was antithetical to the suggestion 
that the questions are beyond judicial determination.21 
In a separate opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart stated that the 
majority opinion went no further than holding simply that the 
matters involved in Baker v. Garr constituted a subject mat-
ter within the jurisdiction of the district courts, and that they 
were not non-justiciable "political questions," saving until the 
time at which there might be occasion to review the case on the 
merits the question of the extent to which the equal protection 
clause prohibits rural bias in legislative apportionment.22 If Mr. 
Justice Stewart was accurate in this view of what the majority 
opinion held, there can be little quarrel with its correctness. In 
the context of the Baker case, however, it would be idle to demon-
strate the justiciability of the controversy by showing that such 
controversies have often been decided on the merits, if in this 
process it becomes apparent that they were all decided in a man-
ner adverse to the contention of the Baker plaintiffs. So, as Mr. 
Justice Brennan proceeded to distinguish the fourteen pertinent 
Supreme Court decisions since 1932,23 ostensibly simply to show 
that they do not hold the issues non-justiciable, he used consum-
mate care to avoid the implication that in any of them the Court 
had decided the merits of the constitutional right asserted in the 
case at bar. At the start it should be stated that these decisions 
cannot be distinguished on the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, for 
not only have nearly identical claims been before the Court24 on 
19 339 U.S. 276 (1950). 
20 335 U.S. 281 (1948). 
21 E.g., Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. I (1932). See also Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 
(1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932); Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932). 
22 369 U.S. at 265. 
23 See cases cited in note 11 supra. 
24 The facts in Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1946), are very similar, if not 
identical. In the Barrett case the statute under attack was the Illinois Apportionment 
Act of 1901 [ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 150, 152 (1961)] enacted the same y~r that the 
Tennessee act under attack in Baker v. Carr was passed, and based upon the same cen• 
sus (that of 1900). The Illinois provision was, therefore, forty-six years old at the time 
the Barrett case brought, while in Baker v. Carr the Tennessee act was sixty. In 
Illinois, by 1940, the largest senate district was roughly sixteen times as populous as the 
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several occasions, but the precise statute challenged as unconsti-
tutional in Baker was before the Court in an earlier case.25 
Wood v. Broom26 was disposed of in a footnote quoting from 
Mr. Justice Rutledge's opinion in Colegrove v. Green, to the 
effect that the Wood case decided no constitutional questions, but 
"the Court disposed of the cause on the ground that the 1929 Re-
apportionment Act ... did not carry forward the requirements of 
the 1911 Act ... , and declined to decide whether there was equity 
in the bill."27 The Brennan opinion continued, "We agree with 
this view of Wood v. Broom."28 Certainly from the vantage point 
of 1946, when Mr. Justice Rutledge delivered his opinion in Cole-
grove, Wood v. Broom was not strong precedent, inasmuch as the 
Court did not discuss the point of an equal protection right to 
equality of representation unaided by an act of Congress. The 
claim was grounded upon this contention, however, as well as 
upon the statute, a fact noted by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in his 
opinion.20 This was explained away by the Colegrove plaintiffs 
as illustrating the principle that where relief is sought on two 
grounds and granted on one of them, and the ground upon which 
relief is granted proves to be erroneous, the appellate court will 
smallest, with one senator elected from each district. In Tennessee, house and senate 
districts are combined for application of Mr. Justice Clark's representative quotient. 
By this method, he determined that the differences were in the order of 100 to I. In 
South v. Peters, however, the differences were conceded to be of that order. See text 
infra at 723-24. 
25 Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956). The Mccanless case was an appeal from 
the Supreme Court of Tennessee. See text infra at 736. 
26 287 U.S. 1 (1932). 
27 328 U.S. at 565. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Justice Rutledge placed 
his willingness to dismiss for lack of equity on the ground that the elections were to be 
held shortly and it was doubtful if effective relief could be given. In Wood v. Broom, 
the four Justices who voted to reverse and dismiss the bill for want of equity were 
dealing with a case in which relief had been granted, and in which there was a per-
manent injunction outstanding. Accordingly, there was no problem about the efficacy 
of relief. Nor was there, presumably, any feeling that the relief granted was in any 
way inappropriate or would create local chaos. The same relief had been granted in 
the previous term in Smiley v. Holm, Koenig v. Flynn, and Carroll v. Becker. In this 
connection, it is interesting to note that, after the granting of the injunction below, 
the defendants applied to Mr. Justice Cardozo for supersedeas. The application was 
denied in an opinion which pointed out that both the laws of Mississippi and those of 
the United States provided for special elections to fill vacancies, and, as a consequence, 
it could be said that no irreparable harm would result from permitting the injunction 
to stay in force until the matter could be settled on the merits. See Record, p. 35, 
Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932). 
28 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 234 n.59. 
20 Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. at 4: "The alleged grounds of invalidity were that the 
act violated Art. I, § 4, and the Fourteenth Amendment, of the Constitution of the 
United States, and § 3 of the Act of Congress of August 8, 1911 ...• " 
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reverse the judgment without considering the other ground. It 
is said there that the Lawyers Edition headnote to Wood v. Broom 
explains the case in that fashion.30 Of course the headnote referred 
to says no such thing. It says, instead, that where relief is granted 
on a ground which on appeal proves to be erroneous, the Court 
will refuse to rule on the question of whether or not the plaintiff 
would have been entitled to relief had the ground on which it had 
been granted been upheld on appeal.31 This is an accurate state-
ment of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes's opinion. 
In Colegrove v. Green, said Mr. Justice Brennan, "the Court 
followed [Smiley v. Holm,32 Koenig v. Flynn,33 and Carroll v. 
Becker34] ••• although over the dissent of three of the seven J us-
tices who participated in that decision." He went on to say that 
"indeed, the refusal to award relief in Colegrove resulted only 
from the controlling view of a want of equity ."35 
The first of these statements is somewhat misleading. The 
Court did not follow the precedents in Smiley, Koenig, and Car-
roll. In those cases the constitutional issue was decided on the 
merits and relief was granted. In Colegrove v. Green, the most 
that can be said is that four members of the Court expressed an 
opinion that the issues were justiciable. Though Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge expressed his agreement with Justices Black, Douglas and 
Murphy in their view that the Court was empowered to decide 
the constitutional question, he expressly refused to reach it, for 
his view of dismissal for want of equity was one of avoiding un-
necessary constitutional decisions.36 So while four members of the 
seven-man Court thought the issues were justiciable, the Court 
did not hold them to be so, nor did it follow the precedents said 
to demonstrate their justiciability. It dismissed the appeal. Since 
the persuasion of Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge 
on this issue had no connection with the outcome of the case, it 
remains what it was-an expression of opinion by a minority of 
the full Court. 
30 S Brief for the Better Government Association as Amicus Curiae, p. 69, Colegrove 
v. Gree_,, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
31 See 77 L. Ed. 131 (1932), headnote 2: "Where it appears that the ground on which 
injunction was granted below does not exist, the Supreme Court of the United States 
will not consider the right of the complainant to relief in equity upon the allegations 
of the complaint or the justiciability of the controversy, assuming such ground to exist." 
32 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
33 285 U.S. 375 (1932). 
34 285 U.S. 380 (1932). 
35 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 232, 234. 
36 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. at 564. 
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The second statement is simply incorrect. Since Mr. Justice 
Rutledge did not reach the issues of substantive constitutional law, 
there is no warrant for saying that, absent the prevailing view of 
want of equity, relief would have been afforded to the Colegrove 
plaintiffs. All that can be said along this line is that, absent the 
prevailing view of want of equity, the claim of constitutional dep-
rivation would have been decided. Mr. Justice Rutledge gave 
no hint as to which way he would vote on such a claim. As a con-
sequence one cannot say whether or not relief would have been 
granted. 
Having thus disposed of the two cases in which there were 
signed opinions, Mr. Justice Brennan turned to the per curiam 
decisions. Of the first of these, Cook v. Fortson (Turman v. Duck-
worth ),37 he said that the appeals there were dismissed as moot. 
In this he was correct, although in disposing of them the Court 
cited Colegrove v. Green as well as United States v. Anchor Coal 
Co.38 "MacDougall v. Green,"39 he continued, "held only that in 
that case equity would not act to void the State's requirement that 
there be at least a minimum of support for nominees for state-wide 
office, over at least a minimal area of the State."40 MacDougall 
arose out of the efforts of the Progressive Party to run a slate of 
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, as 
well as candidates for local offices, in Illinois in the election of 
1948. Under applicable provisions of the Illinois election laws, 
new parties were required to file a petition containing the signa-
tures of twenty-five thousand qualified voters, including at least 
two hundred qualified voters from each of at least fifty of the state's 
one hundred and two counties. The Progressive Party submitted 
such a petition with the requisite total number of signatures. The 
petition did not meet the requirement of two hundred each from 
at least fifty counties, and, as a consequence, the election officials 
refused to print the names of its candidates and electors on the 
official ballot. MacDougall involved a suit brought before a three-
judge district court to require them to do so. The court dismissed 
the cause for want of jurisdiction, citing no precedents, and the 
plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. In a short per curiam 
37 329 U.S. 675 (1946). 
38 279 U.S. 812 (1929) (on the subject of mootness). The Anchor Coal case was not 
exactly in point, but made reference to dismissals of appeals for mootness. In the case 
itself there was an outstanding injunction and the court held that the proper disposition 
was to reverse the lower court and vacate its judgment. 
30 335 U.S. 281 (1948). 
40 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 234-35. 
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opinion the Supreme Court affirmed. The opinion read, in part, 
as follows: 
"To assume that political power is a function exclusively of 
numbers is to disregard the practicalities of government. 
Thus, the Constitution protects the interests of the smaller 
against the greater by giving in the Senate entirely unequal 
representation to populations. It would be strange indeed, 
and doctrinaire, for this Court, applying such broad consti-
tutional concepts as due process and equal protection of the 
laws, to deny a State the power to assure a proper diffusion 
of political initiative as between its thinly populated coun-
ties and those having concentrated masses, in view of the fact 
that the latter have practical opportunities for exerting their 
political weight at the polls not available to the former. The 
Constitution-a practical instrument of government-makes 
no such demands on the States."41 
Mr. Justice Brennan's characterization of the case, if the phrase 
in his opinion indicating that in MacDougall the Court "held only 
that in that case equity would not act"42 can be interpreted as sug-
gesting that the cause was disposed of by reference to some equita-
ble consideration such as time, relief, or the like, is clearly wrong. 
We know this, first, because of the clear and unambiguous language 
of the opinion: "The Constitution . . . makes no such demands 
on the States."43 We know it also because Mr. Justice Rutledge 
wrote a concurring opinion in which he reiterated his view that 
constitutional questions should be avoided where possible and 
indicated that he would follow the same procedure he had sug-
gested in Colegrove and dismiss the appeal on the discretionary 
ground of want of equity. He saw in the case the same factors of 
time and doubt about the ability to give effective relief as he had 
seen in Colegrove.44 The difference between Colegrove v. Green 
and MacDougall v. Green was in the fact that the latter was heard 
by a full Court and the majority did not need the vote of Mr. 
Justice Rutledge. Rutledge was under no doubt that the case 
was decided on the merits and his concurrence was written to 
demonstrate his disagreement. 
The MacDougall majority cited Colegrove v. Green and Cole-
41 MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. at 283-84. 
42 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 234. 
43 MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. at 284. (Emphasis added.) 
44 To avoid confusion, Colegrove has been used to designate Colegrove v. Green, 
Barrett to designate Colegrove v. Barrett, and MacDougall for MacDougall v. Green. 
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grove v. Barrett as authority for the proposition that the Consti-
tution makes no demand on the states that they refrain from 
assuring a proper diffusion of political initiative as between their 
thinly-populated counties and those with concentrated masses.45 
The Barrett case was, in a way, a non-identical twin of Cole-
grove v. Green. They were successive steps in the long legal 
battle to force the state of Illinois to reapportion. The Illinois 
General Assembly reapportioned the legislature and congressional 
districts in the year 1901. For the next three censuses it did noth-
ing, and, because of the very rapid growth of the city of Chicago, 
congressional, state senate and General Assembly districts became 
greatly different in population. Efforts to enlist the aid of the 
Illinois courts to require the General Assembly to reapportion 
state senate and General Assembly districts were three times re-
jected by the state supreme court, which refused mandamus to 
compel reapportionment,46 refused to declare invalid acts adopted 
by the General Assembly on the alleged ground that the members 
of the General Assembly did not constitute a de jure legislature,47 
and refused to unseat members in a quo warranto proceeding.48 
In 1931, the General Assembly enacted a new congressional appor-
tionment act.49 Although the new act embodied smaller differ-
entials in representation ratios than existed by this time under 
the act of 1901, the districts were nonetheless far from equal in 
population, the largest containing 541,785 inhabitants and the 
smallest 158,738, a difference of roughly three to one.50 An action 
was brought to enjoin the expenditure of money to hold the 
congressional election of 1932 under the provisions of the act of 
1931, and the state supreme court sustained the contentions that 
the act violated both the Congressional Apportionment Act of 
1911, and the provisions of the constitution of Illinois.51 To the 
horror of the plaintiffs, however, it went on to hold that since the 
act of 1931 was unconstitutional and void, the applicable provi-
sion was the act of 1901, under which the districts varied from 
914,053 to 112,116, a difference of over eight to one.52 An action 
41'i MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. at 283-84. 
46 Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926). See SEARS, METHODS OF REAPPOR· 
TIONlllENT 4-ll (1952). Other Illinois cases failing to grant relief are listed in the com-
plaint in Colegrove v. Barrett (unreported), No. 46, C 1946, N.D. Ill. 
47 Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Ill. 437, 164 N.E. 665 (1928). 
48 People ex rel. Fergus v. Blackwell, 342 Ill. 223, 173 N.E. 750 (1930). 
40 LAws OF THE STATE OF ILUNOIS 545 (1931). 
r;o See Moran v. Bowley, 347 III. 148, 150, 179 N.E. 526,527 (1932). 
151 Ibid. 
152 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. at 557. 
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was then brought seeking to invalidate the 1901 act. Meanwhile 
the Supreme Court of the United States decided Wood v. Broom. 
The Illinois supreme court then held that the federal ground 
which sustained its earlier decision was withdrawn by that case 
and, reversing itself on the state constitutional ground, refused 
to interfere.53 It was at this point that Colegrove v. Greenr,4 was 
filed, seeking the aid of the federal courts. After losing in that case 
by a three-one-three decision, Colegrove v. Barrett55 was brought, 
attacking in the federal courts the Illinois state senate apportion-
ment. One may well ask how it could be assumed by Illinois fran-
chise reformers that a suit attacking the validity of the state 
senate apportionment would be successful where attack on con-
gressional apportionment had failed. It must be remembered, 
however, that in Colegrove v. Green they had lost by one vote, 
and that vote was cast on the ground of lack of equity stemming at 
least partially from the individual facts of time. It must also be 
remembered that Colegrove v. Green mustered no majority of a 
full court and that, by the time Colegrove v. Barrett was filed, Mr. 
Chief Justice Vinson and Mr. Justice Jackson were sitting. The 
district court dismissed for want of equity, without opinion, pre-
sumably relying upon the ground given in Colegrove v. Green. On 
appeal the Supreme Court dismissed for want of a substantial fed-
eral question, Mr. Justice Rutledge putting his vote to dismiss on 
the ground that the Court had refused to rehear Colegrove v. 
Green and to hear Cook v. Fortson (Turman v. Duckworth). 
Mr. Justice Brennan withheld discussion of the Barrett case 
until last in disposing of the per curiam decisions, and brushed 
it off with the following observation: "Lastly, Colegrove v. Barrett 
... , in which Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred in this Court's 
refusal to note the appeal from a dismissal for want of 
equity, is sufficiently explained by his statement in Cook v. Fort-
son,56 supra: 'The discretionary exercise or non-exercise of equi-
table or declaratory judgment jurisdiction ... in one case is not 
precedent in another case where the facts differ.' "u7 The state-
ment is no doubt true in an abstract sense, though one would sup-
pose that if the difference in fact alluded to relates to one of the 
facts on which the first decision turned, it is true of all precedents. 
53 Daly v. County of Madison, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N.E.2d 160 (1941). 
54 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
55 No. 46, C 1946, N.D. Ill. (unreported). 
56 329 U.S. 675 (1945). 
57 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 236-37. 
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In the context of the statement in his Cook (Turman) 58 opinion, 
what Mr. Justice Rutledge meant was undoubtedly that since the 
actual decision in Colegrove v. Green turned upon questions of 
timing and the efficacy of equitable relief in that case-his being 
the deciding vote-it was no bar to the consideration of the con-
stitutional questions in Cook (Turman), and further, that Cook 
(Turman), unlike Colegrove, did not deal with allocation of 
representatives among geographical subdivisions of the state; 
rather, it dealt with distribution of influence in the nomination 
of officers to be selected at large. 
What relevance does the statement have, then, in the effort 
to distinguish the Baker case from the Barrett case? In the latter, 
the Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the bill by the dis-
trict court presented no substantial federal question. Since the 
district court delivered no opinion, it is not apparent that the 
decision was based on the ground that there existed any special 
equity considerations such as lack of time to give adequate relief. 
The relief requested was substantially the same. On the constitu-
tional level the cases present exactly the same issues and the dis-
crepancies in representation ratios complained about in Barrett 
were only slightly smaller than those complained of in Baker.59 
In short, if it is conceded that differences in facts can take the 
teeth out of earlier decisions, Mr. Justice Brennan failed to point 
out any differences in facts between Baker and Barrett which could 
be expected to accomplish that result. As a matter of fact, he sug-
gested no differences at all. 
At this point it is useful to go back and place the decisions 
from Colegrove v. Green through MacDougall v. Green in orderly 
sequence to see if it is possible to trace the Court alignment on 
the issues involved. As we have seen, in Colegrove v. Green no 
questions of constitutional law were finally decided. No questions 
of any sort were decided by a majority of the full Court. Soon 
after the qualification of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Mr. J us-
tice Jackson's return to the Court, an effort was made to reopen 
the case so that the issues could receive the attention of the full 
Court. In the meanwhile, the appeals in Cook v. Fortson (Turman 
v. Duckworth) were filed. The motion for rehearing in Colegrove 
v. Green was heard and disposed of by the same seven members 
who had sat on that case, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Jack-
58 Cook v. Fortson (Turman v. Duckworth), 329 U.S. 675 (1946). 
50 See note 24 supra. 
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son taking no part. Mr. Justice Rutledge was of the opinion that 
the petition for rehearing should be granted and the case set 
down for argument with Cook (Turman). He did not consider the 
latter obviously moot and apparently thought a consideration of 
the three cases together by the full Court would serve to clear up 
the fog produced by the various opinions of the "bobtailed" Court 
in Colegrove v. Green.60 His reasons are obscure but hinted at 
by his Colegrove opinion. He was of the opinion that the issues 
were justiciable, and may have wished to have that issue ruled 
upon by the full Court to avoid the effect of the "political ques-
tion" language in the Frankfurter opinion on subsequent efforts 
to raise these issues. If this was his motive, subsequent events sug-
gest that perhaps he was correct. In any event it is hard to suggest 
other motives in view of his desire to dispose of the case in the 
first instance on the ground that the time factor made relief of 
doubtful efficacy, and his statement that wherever possible the 
substantive constitutional question should be avoided. It had been 
avoided in Colegrove v. Green, and the mootness of Cook (Tur-
man) was certainly plausible enough to provide as sensible an 
"out" as the time considerations were in Colegrove. 
The views of the three Colegrove dissenters are also of inter-
est. Since Mr. Justice Rutledge favored rehearing, and the peti-
tion for rehearing was heard by only seven members of the Court, 
it was within their power to reopen the case. They did not, and 
the two motions for rehearing were denied.61 In Colegrove v. 
Barrett, Mr. Justice Rutledge said that he concurred in the dis-
missal in view of the fact that the Colegrove petition for rehearing 
had been denied and the appeals in Cook (Turman) had been 
dismissed. 62 Viewed from the time of occurrence, it might be 
thought that the four who failed to join the Frankfurter opinion 
in Colegrove v. Green had given up, and the matter was settled. 
From their opinions in MacDougall, however, it seems probable 
that the members of the original Colegrove Court remained un-
changed in their positions and that the three dissenters were en-
gaged in what may be called tactics of dissent. They must have 
assumed that their views would not find acceptance among a ma-
jority and were therefore reluctant to risk the possibility that a 
full-scale hearing of the issues, followed by an opinion on the 
60 The term "bobtailed" is borrowed from the Clark opinion in Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. at 252. 
61 329 U.S. 825 (1946); id. at 828. 
62 329 U.S. 675 (1946). 
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merits, would give majority support to the views expressed by 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his Colegrove opinion. In MacDougall, 
of course, this is exactly what happened. Mr. Justice Rutledge 
won his point, however, on the issue of justiciability. The Court 
heard the cause on the merits, and, citing Colegrove and Barrett, 
reached a decision adverse to the views of Justices Black, Douglas, 
and Murphy. The decision in MacDougall is important, then, 
not only because it decided the constitutional issues as posed by 
the facts before the Court in that case, but because presumably it 
casts some light upon the views of the majority of the full Court 
on the meaning of the dismissal of the appeal in Barrett as pre-
senting no substantial federal question, and follows the view of 
the adherents to the Frankfurter opinion in Colegrove that the 
equal protection clause does not require that political influence 
be apportioned among the state's geographical subdivisions on a 
per capita basis, without regard to density of population. In 
summary, the dissenters had lost on their assertion of a constitu-
tional requirement of "one man-one vote." They had won on their 
view that the issue should be heard on the merits. One might ask 
why Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined in deciding the merits, but it 
will be remembered that he also would have decided the merits 
in Colegrove. 
At this point Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge 
left the Court and were replaced by Justices Clark and Minton, 
an event which could not adversely affect the majority but might 
serve to increase its margin. That term brought the appeals in 
South v. Peters63 and in Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors.64 South 
v. Peters was a suit in equity brought in the Federal District Court 
for the Northern District of Georgia seeking to restrain the opera-
tion of the Georgia primary law in the primary election which 
was to be held in 1950 to nominate Democratic candidates for the 
general election to be held later in the same year. Under the 
Georgia act in question a number of unit votes was assigned to 
each county in the State, ranging from six in the eight most popu-
lous counties down to two for some of the smaller counties. In each 
county the votes were counted and the person receiving the major-
ity was credited with all of the unit votes in that county. The case 
was similar to the apportionment cases because it was alleged that 
the assignment of six unit votes to Fulton County, with its 473,572 
63 339 U.S. 276 (1950). 
64 339 U.S. 940 (1950). 
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inhabitants, and two to Chattahoochee, with fewer than 2,000,05 
was a violation of the equal protection clause in that it amounted 
to a debasement of the votes of the residents of Fulton County, 
it being said that a vote in Fulton County was worth I/ 122 of a 
vote in Chattahoochee66 in terms of the influence it had on the 
outcome of the election. The Georgia statute had other evils. 
From the viewpoint of the individual voter, not only might his 
vote be counted as I/ 122 of his counterpart in another county, 
but it might be counted for the person he voted against. Similar 
to the electoral college system, the Georgia unit vote method left 
the possibility that a candidate might be nominated when he had 
received less than a plurality of the votes cast at the primary elec-
tion. 
In a per curiam opinion a divided district court held that the 
system did not violate the Constitution. 67 It read the dismissal of 
the bill in Wood v. Broom, over contentions made under the 
equal protection clause, as having the effect of denying relief under 
the fourteenth amendment, despite the fact that the point was not 
specifically discussed in the majority opinion. It read the minority 
opinion in Wood as "put on the ground that the matter was polit-
ical and not of equitable cognizance." The subsequent cases, said 
the court, followed Wood; they did not overrule it. 
Judge Andrews dissented.68 He saw the issue in South as one 
of whether one man's vote should be counted more than another's. 
He read the Colegrove case as depending upon difficulties in fash-
ioning relief and not standing upon the broader ground of ab-
sence of jurisdiction to correct a political wrong. He took the 
Allwright69 case as settling the question of whether the right to 
vote in a primary election which is an integral part of the state's 
election machinery is within the constitutional protection against 
discriminations in matters of the franchise, and Chapman v. King10 
as holding that the Georgia primary elections were an integral 
part of the election machinery. South, he said, was different from 
Colegrove because it required no future legislation and presented 
no problems in fashioning methods of relief. It was further dis-
65 See South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 278 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
66 Mr. Justice Douglas speaks of the difference as "over 120." The figure 122 to 1 
comes from Judge Andrews' dissenting opinion in the district court. See 89 F. Supp. 672, 
683 (N.D. Ga. 1950). Judge Andrews speaks of the average difference as 11 to 1. 
67 South v. Peters, 89 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Ga. 1950). 
68 Id. at 681. 
69 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
70 154 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1946). 
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tinguished by the fact that in South the plaintiffs did not com-
plain of their county's lack of representation in the General As-
sembly. They simply asserted a constitutionally protected right to 
vote for their nominee for United States Senator, and to have their 
votes counted like all other votes. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court with this com-
ment: "Federal courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity 
powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's geo-
graphical distribution of electoral strength among its political sub-
divisions. See MacDougall v. Green ... ; Colegrove v. Green ... ; 
Wood v. Broom ... ; cf. Johnson v. Stevenson .... "11 
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black, wrote a dis-
senting opinion. He relied upon Colegrove v. Green and Mac-
Dougall v. Green, without mentioning the Wood case. The first, 
he said, depended upon Mr. Justice Rutledge's vote, and was 
decided upon special facts of time and the uncertainty about the 
effectiveness of the relief sought. Those factors, he demonstrated, 
were not present in South. Over two months remained before 
the scheduled primary. MacDougall he apparently interpreted as 
resting upon the question of justiciability: "And in MacDougall 
v. Green ... , the Court on a closely divided vote refused to inter-
fere with the provisions of the Illinois law governing the forma-
tion of a new political party. There is no such force in the argu-
ment that the question in the present case is political and not 
justiciable."72 
Mr. Justice Brennan said that South v. Peters "appears to be a 
refusal to exercise equity's powers."73 Such a refusal is not explain-
able in terms of the sort of problem which prompted Mr. Justice 
Rutledge to put his vote in Colegrove on the ground of want of 
equity. The Court described the class of cases in which federal 
courts "consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers,"74 and 
the class is stated to encompass "cases posing political issues arising 
from a state's geographical distribution of electoral stength among 
its political subdivisions."75 For examples of the application of 
this principle one is referred to Wood v. Broom, Colegrove v. 
Green, and MacDougall v. Green. Wood, if it has any relevance 
to the constitutional question, must have decided it on the merits, 
71 South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950). (Citations omitted.) 
72 Id. at 280. 
73 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 235. 
74 South v. Peters, 339 U.S. at 277. 
7ti Ibid. 
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for as we have seen the Court refused to dispose of the case on the 
ground of want of equity, and refused to say whether or not the 
issues would have been justiciable had there been a statutory 
requirement of equality of population among districts. Since the 
failure to uphold relief granted below in the face of a claim of 
entitlement to it under the fourteenth amendment was not ex-
plained in the majority opinion in Wood, it is of cou~se not be-
yond argument that the Court was of the opinion that a claim 
under the fourteenth amendment is not justiciable, whereas a 
claim under the statute might be, but such a holding would be, 
to all intents and purposes, a holding that there is no requirement 
of equality under the naked fourteenth amendment, but there is 
a power in Congress to provide one. In Colegrove, the deciding 
vote was cast on want of equity in the particular bill, but three 
of the four Justices voting to affirm placed their votes on the 
merits under Wood v. Broom, as well as upon want of equity, the 
discussion of the second ground demonstrating, however, that the 
want of equity rested upon the opinion that the entire class of 
cases was not proper grist for the judicial mill. In MacDougall, 
the merits were heard and determined. 
Certainly Mr. Justice Brennan was correct in stating that the 
South case cannot be looked upon as one in which the Court had 
no jurisdiction over the subject matter. The writer suggests that 
it is also impossible to consider it as one dismissed because of such 
factors as timing or special problems of giving relief. The primary 
election in question was two months away and the relief sought 
did not require anything but an order to the election officials to 
count the votes without debasing them or allocating all votes from 
a county to the candidate receiving a plurality within the county. 
Whatever the reason for non-intervention, the Court announced 
adherence to such a policy in equity cases involving "political" 
issues arising out of geographical allocation of electoral strength. 
Just why the language of the short statement handed down in the 
South case returned to that of abstention from adjudicating "polit-
ical" issues76 rather than the plain language of absence of constitu-
tional requirement employed in MacDougall77 is not apparent. 
The language seems to be a return to the Frankfurter position in 
Colegrove, that these political controversies are things that equity 
courts are well out of, whether or not they might be of the opinion 
76 See text at notes 74-75 supra. 
77 See text at note 40 supra. 
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that there is alleged some evil which might abstractly be considered 
violative of the principles of equality suggested by the general pro-
visions of the Constitution. The references to the previous cases 
indicate that the Court is not modifying these decisions, but may 
suggest that it is less willing to say that the Georgia legislature 
had achieved a "proper distribution" of political initiative than 
it was in speaking of the Illinois statute. On its facts, then, South 
is a much stronger case than MacDougall, but it does employ the 
language of discretion, rather than the language of power, or of 
constitutional substance. 
The appeal in Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors78 was decided 
a week after the Court ~elivered its opinion in South. Tedesco 
was a case in which plaintiffs contested the validity of the new 
charter of the city of New Orleans. Under the old charter the city 
was governed under a so-called commission plan. A mayor and 
four commission councilmen were elected at large. After their 
election and qualification the subject-matter functions of the city 
government were parcelled out among the councilmen, each be-
coming administrative head of one of the city's departments. The 
new charter added three members to the commission council and 
provided that the seven commission councilmen should be elected 
from districts, retaining the at-large election of the mayor. The 
election districts named were the so-called "municipal districts" 
of the city, which varied in population from 8,508 to 48,020. The 
complaint charged that the new charter was unconstitutional in 
that it subjected the plaintiff to government by persons for whom 
he was not permitted to vote, and in that residents of the less pop-
ulous districts were given greater representation in the commission 
council than those who resided in those more heavily populated. 
Since the claim was joined with a variety of allegations of uncon-
stitutionality under the Louisiana constitution, the bill was 
brought in the state courts. The Court of Appeal for the Parish 
of New Orleans disposed of the state claims and then, after a 
review of the United States Supreme Court cases, held that the 
charter did not violate the fourteenth amendment. Expressing 
some doubt that discrimination of any sort other than violation 
of the fifteenth or nineteenth amendments was prohibited under 
the Constitution, it said that, in any event to show constitutionally 
prohibited discrimination without demonstrating violation of the 
fifteenth or nineteenth amendment, it would be necessary to show 
78 839 U.S. 940 (1950). 
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that the plan under attack did not admit of benign construction. 
It added that possible benign legislative motives had been sug-
gested and therefore in the case at bar no "unwarranted" and hence 
unconstitutional discrimination had been shown. 79 
The appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed for want of 
a substantial federal question.80 The Court was unanimous; there 
was no written opinion, and no cases were cited. Mr. Justice Bren-
nan interpreted Tedesco as holding "solely that no substantial fed-
eral question was raised by a state court's refusal to upset the dis-
tricting of city council seats, especially as it was urged that there 
was a rational justification for the challenged districting."81 
What Mr. Justice Brennan meant by this is rather obscure. 
Does Tedesco depend upon the fact that it is an appeal from a 
state court's decision? There is no hint in the lower court opinion 
of any independent state ground for the decision. The federal 
constitutional issue was squarely faced and decided. The allega-
tion was that a citizen living in one district of 8,508 was repre-
sented by one commission councilman and his fellow citizen in 
another district containing over five times as many inhabitants 
was also represented by one member, a difference in representation 
ratio of over five to one. The court's answer was: "We conclude 
that there is nothing in the statute violative of ... any of the pro-
visions of the Federal Constitution nor the amendments thereof."82 
Nor was there any suggestion in Tedesco that the state court was 
either unable or unwilling to grant the relief asked, had it been 
of the opinion that the new charter violated the provisions of the 
Constitution. Indeed, the court stated that, following the lead of 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana, it would "pretermit" the "vari-
ous pleas and exceptions," and pass directly to the merits because 
it was desirable that the issues be promptly and finally settled, so 
that the city could commence operations under its new charter.83 
Can it be that a decision on the merits disposing of a claim under 
the United States Constitution, in a case in which the state court 
dispenses with formalities and decides the merits because it wants 
an early and final determination, presents no substantial federal 
question, independent of the merits of the particular claim? The 
79 Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for Parish of Orleans, 43 So. 2d 514, 
518 (La. Ct. App. 1949). 
so Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950). 
81 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 235. 
82 43 So. 2d 514, 519 (La. Ct. App. 1949). 
83 Id. at 516. See City of New Orleans v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for Parish 
of Orleans, 216 La. 115, 43 So. 2d 237 (1949). 
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writer suggests that the case cannot turn upon the fact that the 
case was originally decided by a state tribunal. Relations between 
federal and state courts may require the federal courts to refrain 
as much as possible from ordering state courts to provide remedies 
they do not choose to provide; it certainly does not require that 
the Supreme Court leave the state without a solution as to con-
stitutional issues until someone brings another suit in a federal 
court. 
Nor does the fact that Tedesco involves the representation of 
citizens on a local council commission serve to distinguish the 
case. If a citizen has a right to equal representation in the state 
legislature, can it be that he has no similar right to representation 
in the legislature of the local jurisdiction in which he lives? The 
writer should have thought that this question was decided in the 
negative in 1915, in Myers v. Anderson.84 There the defendant 
argued that the fifteenth amendment did not apply to municipal 
elections, but he lost. Can it be that the fourteenth amendment is 
any less universal in its application to the various levels of state 
and local government? 
In regard to the rational justification of the challenged district-
ing, it should be mentioned initially that prior to the enactment of 
the new charter amendments in 1948, the members of the com-
mission council were all elected at large. Two arguments were 
made against the change to district elections. The first was to the 
effect that mere election from districts made the amendment un-
constitutional. The state court made short shrift of this, pointing 
out that the members of many of the state's institutions of govern-
ment were selected from districts, including the members of the 
state supreme court. The other argument was inequality in the 
population of the districts. To this the court had said that not 
difference but "unwarranted" discrimination would have to ap-
pear. It went on to say that such unwarranted discrimination, if 
shown, would invalidate the statute. It then inquired into the 
"real reason" for the passage of the legislation. Whatever that 
may have been, said the court, "whether the reason was political, 
or whether it was punitive, we must assume that the legislature 
acted properly and on sound reason."85 
Continuing, the state court made the following statement, 
84 238 U.S. 368 (1915). 
81:i Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for Parish of Orleans, 43 So. 2d 514, 
518 (La. Ct. App. 1949). 
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resulting in Mr. Justice Brennan's qualification dealing with "ra-
tional justification for the challenged districting." 
"Counsel for defendants call attention to the fact that at the 
present time no one of the Commissioners was chosen from 
the downtown or lower districts of the City, and they call 
attention to the further fact that there are divergent groups, 
social and otherwise, who live in the various districts and 
counsel suggest that possibly a realization of the fact that 
some of these downtown groups are not represented on the 
present Commission Council led the Legislature to decide that 
some method should be adopted under which each of the var-
ious districts, however located, would be represented. We do 
not know that this was the reason, but it is a possible reason, 
and who can say that it is not a sound reason. If it was, then 
there was no unfair discrimination."86 
This is plainly nothing more than an example of the time-honored 
statement that courts will presume that the legislature has done 
its duty and leave to the plaintiffs the task of demonstrating other-
wise. Since "certain groups, social and othenvise" are everywhere 
present in unlimited variations, the possible rational base for the 
discrepancies "urged" upon the Court in Tedesco is present in 
all apportionment schemes. If its urging in Tedesco distinguishes 
that case from the rest, it is a triumph of ritual over substance. 
Before further changes in the personnel of the Court, three 
more apportionment cases were decided. The first of these was 
Remmey v. Smith.87 Remmey was a suit in a federal district court 
to challenge the Pennsylvania Apportionment Act of 1921, as 
applied in 1951, and to compel the legislature to reapportion the 
state in a constitutional manner. The district court dismissed the 
bill. The majority, in an opinion by Judge Biggs, said that even 
where the apportionment in the selection of national representa-
tives was involved, the Supreme Court had held that the issues 
were "of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for 
judicial determination."88 He went on to say that, a fortiori, a 
court of the United States should not compel a state to apportion 
with respect to its own legislature. In a footnote he stated his 
opinion that the question of jurisdiction was not a settled one.89 
In any event he thought that while the legislature was still in ses-
86 Id. at 519. 
87 342 U.S. 916 (1952). 
88 Remmey v. Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708, 710 (E.D. Pa. 1951). 
89 Id. at 710 n.11. 
1963] LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 731 
sion, and the 1950 census only a year old, the suit was prematurely 
brought, and for that reason he would dismiss it for want of equity. 
Judge Bard concurred, but went to the merits.90 Relying upon 
Minor v. Happersett,91 he took the discriminations prohibited by 
law to be only those based upon race, color, previous condition 
of servitude, and sex. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal 
for want of a substantial federal question. It cited no cases. Mr. 
Justice Brennan limited the authority of the case to the ground 
given by the district court, the fact that the case was prematurely 
brought. 
The second case was Cox v. Peters.92 Cox was an appeal from 
the Supreme Court of Georgia, which court had again upheld 
the county unit primary system under attack in South v. Peters.93 
The Georgia court had held that the right to vote in a primary 
election was not within the protection of the equal protection 
clause unless, under the rule of Classic,94 Allwright95 and Hern-
don, 96 the primary is an integral part of the election machinery 
of the state. In Chapman v. King the Georgia primary had been 
held to be an integral part of the election machinery of the state, 
but the court took that case to be no longer applicable because of 
subsequent changes in the Georgia constitution. The Georgia 
law did not require the holding of a primary but specified how 
it must be held if the party decided to hold one. This fact, the 
court said, distinguished it from Classic, Allwright, and Herndon. 
On appeal, the appellees recognized the thinness of this hold-
ing and did not rely upon it alone.97 They stated that they were 
not contending that the fifteenth amendment does not confer upon 
Negro citizens of Georgia the right to vote in the primaries, and 
rested their case on Minor v. Happersett and on the apportion-
ment decisions. The appellants were anxious to frame the issue 
as one of whether primaries involve "state action" where they are 
regulated as to method but not required-with some warrant one 
would suppose, in view of the fact that the holding below was 
constitutionally feeble. They argued that since the Georgia court 
oo Id. at 711. 
01 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). 
92 342 U.S. 936 (1952). 
93 339 U.S. 276 (1950). 
94 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
Oli Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
06 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
07 See Statement Opposing Jurisdiction and Motion To Dismiss or Affirm, p. 4, Cox 
v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952). 
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had decided upon that ground and had not considered the ques-
tion of asserted right to equal influence, the Court should grant 
a summary reversal. Instead, it dismissed the appeal for want of 
a substantial federal question. When the decision came down, and 
the appellants noticed that no opinion had been written and no 
cases cited, they filed a motion for rehearing, praying that the 
Court at least give a statement of reasons because the decision 
might be taken as holding the fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments do not apply to Georgia primaries at all. In aid of this 
motion the United States, through its Solicitor General, filed a 
memorandum in which the Solicitor General interpreted the 
Court's dismissal of the appeal not as approving the ground stated 
by the Georgia Supreme Court, that holding being clearly in-
consistent with Classic, Allwright, and Herndon, but as following 
the apportionment cases.98 On the authority of Doremus v. Board 
of Education,99 he argued that since the apportionment cases rested 
on absence of jurisdiction in the federal courts, there might still 
be jurisdiction in the state courts to adjudicate the issues. This 
motion was denied without comment or the citation of authority. 
Mr. Justice Brennan had this to say about the case: "And Cox v. 
Peters . .. dismissed for want of a substantial federal question the 
appeal from the state court's holding that their primary elections 
implicated no 'state action.' "100 This is a factually accurate state-
ment, of course, but the implication that Cox was dismissed be-
cause of the Court's views on the line to be drawn in defining 
"state action" in primaries is in this writer's opinion absurd. In 
98 See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Petition for Rehearing, p. 6, Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952): "We do not construe 
the Court's dismissal of the appeal as implicitly approving this ground of the State 
court's decision ..•. It would appear, however, that the dismissal of the appeal rests 
upon an application of the rule applied in South v. Peters, supra, as to the nonjusticia-
ble character, so far as federal courts are concerned, of the political questions involved in 
the suit. Ordinarily, of course, the Court limits its review solely to a consideration of the 
precise federal question decided by the state court ..•• And where a state court decision is 
based on an erroneous federal ground, its judgment will be vacated and the cause remanded, 
notwithstanding that the state court might have based its decision on another ground, not 
considered and decided by it, which would have been adequate to support the 
judgment ...• 
"In this case, however, presumably because a similar controversy had been here two 
terms ago in South v. Peters, supra, the Court apparently pretermitted the immediate 
question decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia and went directly to what it deemed 
the ultimate issue in the case, namely, the merits of the claim of violation of federal 
constitutional rights." 
99 Id. at 3. See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952). 
100 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 235. 
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the light of Classic,1°1 Allwright,1°2 and Herndon,103 and with the 
hindsight of Terry v. A dams,104 it is literally inconceivable that 
the Court should have thought that the Georgia court's holding 
on "state action" was correct. Undoubtedly the Solicitor General's 
interpretation of the dismissal was proper, that is, that where the 
overturning of the state court ruling would leave the case one of 
bald allegation of geographical differences in representation ratio, 
in no respect different from the allegations made in South v. 
Peters, the Court would not trouble itself to correct the state court 
on the ground of its decision where the result was clearly con-
sistent with the Supreme Court precedents.105 Certainly the bar 
did not take Cox to hold what Mr. Justice Brennan implies that it 
held, since it was not so much as referred to in the briefs in Terry 
v. Adams,1°6 nor was it mentioned in any of the four opinions in 
that case, though if it was a precedent in the "state action" line 
of cases, it was obviously in want of distinguishing, for certainly 
the Georgia law governing primaries was much less private in its 
operation than was the Jaybird Association. Is it conceivable that 
had Cox been a plausible claimant under the fifteenth amend-
ment, his claim would have raised no substantial federal question? 
And certainly if a right to equal geographical representation exists 
under the fourteenth, there is no way to distinguish the effect of 
such a holding, for "state action" is required to invoke both the 
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 
If one assumes that Cox does not turn on this point, but on 
the law as announced in earlier apportionment cases, what does 
it add to the growth of the doctrine of judicial non-intervention? 
In the first place, it was an action at law for money damages, not 
a suit in equity. It could not then be resolved on a doctrine of dis-
cretionary power to refrain from exercising equity jurisdiction. If 
the non-intervention rule rested on article III,1°7 as was suggested 
by the Solicitor General, it could be explained as taking the mat-
ter away from all federal courts, including the Supreme Court, 
but such an interpretation runs squarely into the holdings in 
101 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
102 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
103 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
104 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
105 See note 98 supra. 
100 See Petition for Certiorari, Brief for Petitioners, Brief for Respondents, and 
Petition for Rehearing, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
107 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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MacDougall v. Green108 and South v. Peters,1°0 where the language 
of the Court's opinions precludes an inference that the matter 
presents no case or controversy under the provisions of article III. 
The only basis of the decision consistent with all prior precedents 
is the ground that the unit system, already upheld on the merits 
by the federal district court in South v. Peters, in a decision af-
firmed by the Supreme Court, did not deprive the residents of 
the more populous counties of any right under the equal protec-
tion clause. 
It is true that the method employed by Mr. Justice Brennan 
in disposing of the case cost nothing, for though it was left to 
depend upon a holding which was erroneous, and completely 
inconsistent with the Court's prior decisions, the question of 
"state action" in holding primaries was settled by the Terry110 
case, leaving Cox taken care of without risking future embarrass-
ment to the Court. This is not so clear in Anderson v. ]ordan,111 
the third of the cases before the Court during this period. Ander-
son also arose in a state court. It was an action invoking the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in mandamus to 
force the legislature of that state to reapportion. The writ was 
denied per curiam, without opinion.112 The Chief Justice of 
California issued a certificate to the effect that the constitutional 
issue had been heard and decided. In the United States Supreme 
Court the appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
question.113 There was no opinion, but a reference to the same 
three cases referred to in South v. Peters:114 MacDougall v. Green,m 
Colegrove v. Green,116 and Wood v. Broom.117 Mr. Justice Black 
and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented.U8 In Anderson v. ]ordan119 it 
was argued by the Attorney General of California that the certifi-
cate did not indicate that the federal issue was necessary to the 
decision, and Mr. Justice Brennan seized upon that to distinguish 
10s 335 U.S. 281 (1948). 
100 339 U.S. 276 (1950). 
110 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
111 343 U.S. 912 (1952). 
112 The decision of the Supreme Court of California is unreported. See Statement 
as to Jurisdiction, Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952). 
113 Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952). 
114 339 U.S. 276 (1950). 
115 335 U.S. 281 (1948). 
116 328 U .s. 549 (1946). 
117 287 U.S. 1 (1932). 
118 South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276,277 (1950). 
119 343 U.S. 912 (1952). 
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Anderson from Baker. "[In Anderson v. Jordan] it was certain 
only that the State court had refused to issue a discretionary writ, 
original mandamus in the Supreme Court. That had been denied 
without opinion, and of course it was urged here that an adequate 
state ground barred this Court's review."120 Again the statement 
is factually accurate. If this was the ground on which the appeal 
was dismissed, however, how can the references be explained? All 
three of these cases came to the Supreme Court on appeal from 
lower federal courts and could not conceivably have had anything to 
do with independent state grounds. Further, during the same 
term of Court, action on Dixon v. Duffy121 was postponed for 
a second time to await more formal determination of the ground 
upon which the California Supreme Court had decided another 
original jurisdiction case, one involving habeas corpus. Certainly 
had the case turned upon the California Attorney General's con-
tention that the chief justice's certificate was insufficient to show 
the necessity of the decision on the merits of the constitutional 
issue, some reference to the certificate dispute would have been 
included in the references. Instead, the Court dismissed the 
case with: "See MacDougall v. Green ... , Colegrove v. Green 
... , Wood v. Broom .... " Dixon v. Duffy was cited to the 
Court by the appellants and it was urged that, if the certificate 
were deemed insufficient, appellants be given time to obtain a 
more lucid one.122 The next term of Court, with Mr. Justice 
Jackson dissenting, the judgment of the California Supreme 
Court in Dixon v. Duffy was vacated and the cause remanded 
so that the reasons of the California court could be made ex-
plicit.123 Could it be that Anderson, contrary to the then current 
practice of the Court in doubtful certificate cases, was dismissed 
on the ground that there was no adequate showing of a necessarily 
decided federal question, with no opportunity being given the 
appellants to obtain a more satisfactory certificate, and in a memo-
randum decision calling attention to MacDougall, Colegrove, and 
Wood? 
If it is true that Anderson v. Jordan cannot be looked upon as a 
case disposed of on the ground of existence of an independent state 
ground of decision, what is its significance in the line of appor-
120 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 235. 
121 343 U.S. 393 (1952). See also Dixon v. Duffy, 342 U.S. 33 (1951). 
122 See Appellant's Brief Opposing Motion To Dismiss or Affirm, p. 6, Anderson 
v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952). 
12a Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952). 
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tionment cases? The Supreme Court could have disposed of it 
on the ground that the matters sought to be litigated were outside 
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court. As we have seen be-
fore, this ground is untenable, and in any event if the Court 
thought the matter outside its jurisdiction it would hardly call 
attention to MacDougall. It could not have disposed of it upon 
the ground that as a matter of discretion federal courts will not 
exercise their equity powers in such cases, for Anderson was an 
appeal from a state court. Unless it depended upon the certifi-
cate controversy, then, the only way to explain Anderson is that it 
comes within the doctrine of MacDougall v. Green-that the 
Constitution does not require equal apportionment of electoral 
strength among the territorial subdivisions of the state. In Ander-
son, there was no reason assigned for the dismissal of the appeal. 
It was simply noted that the motion to dismiss was granted and 
the appeal dismissed. The motion to dismiss was based upon three 
points. The first was independent state ground; the second, want 
of jurisdiction; and the third, want of a substantiality of the federal 
question because the issue was "political." 
Between Anderson v. Jordan and the next of the apportion-
ment cases, a period of four years elapsed during which there 
were three changes in the Court's personnel. Mr. Chief Justice 
Warren replaced Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, Mr. Justice Harlan 
replaced Mr. Justice Jackson, and Mr. Justice Brennan replaced 
Mr. Justice Minton. In 1956, the Court had before it two appor-
tionment cases. The first of these was Kidd v. McCanless,124 on ap-
peal from a decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court refusing 
to invalidate the same Tennessee apportionment act which was 
later involved in Baker v. Carr. The state supreme court had held 
that it would not declare the act unconstitutional because under 
the Tennessee law of de facto officers, there could be no de facto 
officer after a judicial declaration that he did not hold his office 
de jure.125 Because of this, said the Court, were it to declare the 
act unconstitutional there would be no ·de jure legislature and no 
de facto legislature, even for the purposes of enacting another ap-
portionment act, and the state would be left in chaos. In the 
United States Supreme Court the appeal was dismissed in a per 
curiam opinion which read: "The motion to dismiss is granted 
and the appeal is dismissed. Colegrove v. Green ... , Anderson 
12-1 352 U.S. 920 (1956). 
125 See Kidd v. Mccanless, 200 Tenn. 273,292 S.W.2d 40 (1956). 
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v. Jordan . .''126 Mr. Justice Brennan, in his Baker opinion, 
stated, "Of course this Court was there precluded by the adequate 
state ground, and in dismissing the appeal ... we cited Anderson 
... as well as Colegrove."121 The motion to dismiss was grounded 
upon the existence of an independent state ground, the absence of 
a substantial federal question on the merits, and the view that 
apportionment is a "political question."128 Of course, the decision 
of the Tennessee Supreme Court did rest upon the state law of 
remedies, and necessarily had to, since there were alleged, in ad-
dition to the violations of the Constitution of the United States, 
several patent violations of the constitution of Tennessee, so that 
even had the court decided that there were no violations of federal 
requirements, to sustain the demurrer it would have had to come 
to the conclusion that it was powerless to correct the local abuses. 
It seems, then, that the proper disposition of the case would have 
been to dismiss the appeal because of want of a federal question, 
precisely the reason assigned to the holding by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan. But why were Anderson v. ]ordan129 and Colegrove v. 
Green130 assigned as authority? Colegrove could have no possible 
relevance to this issue. Mr. Justice Brennan suggested that the 
clue could be found in the fact that "we cited Anderson ... as 
well as Colegrove," for Anderson he had previously characterized 
as having been decided on the basis of an independent state ground. 
But when we follow the good Justice's method of finding clues, 
we discover, as we have already seen, that in Anderson we were 
referred to MacDougall, Colegrove, and Wood. This may have 
been, as Mr. Justice Brennan suggested, an effort to characterize 
the case as one dealing with the existence of an independent state 
ground. If so, one can only say with Goethe, "Wenn ich die 
Meinung eines Andern anhoren soll, so muss sie positiv ausges-
prochen werden; Problematisches hab' ich in mir selbst genug."131 
Not only does this backtracking of citations suggested by Mr. 
Justice Brennan lead one to suppose that Kidd v. McCanless takes 
its place among the apportionment cases which have developed 
the so-called Colegrove doctrine, but forward tracking does so as 
120 Kidd v. Mccanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956). (Citations omitted.) 
121 369 U.S. at 236. 
128 Statement in Opposition to Statement of Jurisdiction and Motion To Dismiss, 
p. I, Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956). 
120 343 U.S. 912 (1952). 
130 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
131 "If I am to listen to the opinion of another, then it must be precisely enun-
ciated; I have sufficient difficulties of my own." 
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well. At the same term the Court disposed of the appeal in Rad-
ford v. Gary.132 Radford arose in a federal district court, not in 
the state court system. It was a suit seeking an order in the nature 
of mandamus, requiring the Governor of Oklahoma to convene 
the legislature of that state, requiring the legislature to reappor-
tion, and, that failing, requiring the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
to do it for them. In an opinion by Judge Murrah, the district court 
held that under the Colegrove doctrine the case posed only "state 
political issues" with which the federal courts should not inter-
fere, citing South v. Peters, and concluding that the facts of the 
case could not be distinguished from those in the Colegrove and 
MacDougall cases.133 Before the district court, motion was made 
to dismiss the action because the court lacked jurisdiction over 
the subject matter, and because the complaint failed to state a 
claim against defendants upon which relief could be granted.134 
On appeal, the appellees moved in the following terms: "Appellees 
in the above entitled case move to dismiss on the ground that the 
questions presented in appellant's 'jurisdictional statement' herein 
are so unsubstantial as to not need further argument" and called 
to the Court's attention the pleadings, the motion to dismiss be-
low, the majority opinion below, and "the decisions of the state 
and federal courts including the decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma and of this Court cited and followed in said opin-
ion."135 They filed no briefs and made no arguments. They simply 
rested. The answer to the motion was filed on February 11, 1957, 
and on February 25 the Supreme Court handed down its decision, 
affirming the district court and citing Kidd v. McCanless and 
Colegrove v. Green. 
So Kidd v. McCanless, which Mr. Justice Brennan suggested 
should be recognized as having been dismissed because of the 
existence of an independent state ground, through the citation of 
Anderson v. Jordan in its dismissal, some two months later was 
cited as authority for affirming the decision of a federal district 
court which dismissed an attack on a state apportionment scheme 
flatly on the ground that the Colegrove and MacDougall cases 
could not be distinguished. Mr. Justice Brennan said that "prob-
lems of relief also controlled in Radford v. Gary ... affirming the 
District Court's refusal to mandamus the Governor to call a ses-
132 352 U.S. 991 (1957). 
133 Radford v. Gary, 145 F. Supp. 541 (W .D. Okla. 1956). 
134 See Brief for Appellees, Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957). 
135 Ibid. 
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sion of the legislature, to mandamus the legislature then to appor-
tion, and if they did not comply, to mandamus the State Supreme 
Court to do so."136 In a sense, no doubt, problems of relief are part 
of the substructure of the Colegrove doctrine, whether one con-
siders the doctrine as jurisdictional, as definitive of the periphery 
of the protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment, or sim-
ply as an example of judicial restraint. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
put it, "courts ought not to enter this political. thicket."187 If, on 
the other hand, Mr. Justice Brennan suggested that problems of 
relief take the Radford case out of the general class of cases seeking 
to plunge the federal courts into the "political thicket," or that the 
district court dismissed because of special difficulties in giving 
relief in this particular case under its facts and pleadings, he was 
clearly wrong. The district court took the view that Colegrove 
and the other cases which proliferated the doctrine of judicial 
non-intervention precluded any relief, not that the relief requested 
was inappropriate, or in a proper case beyond the power of this 
district court. 
The next of the apportionment cases was filed during the Octo-
ber 1957 term. By this time Mr. Justice Reed had retired and his 
place had been taken by Mr.Justice Whittaker. The case was Harts-
field v. Sloan.138 In Hartsfield, the plaintiffs sought once again to 
overturn the Neill Primary Act in Georgia. The suit was brought in 
a federal district court against election officials, seeking to restrain 
them from counting primary election ballots according to the 
county unit system. In view of the fact that this was exactly the 
same dispute which had been before the Supreme Court in Cook 
v. Fortson (Turman v. Duckworth), South v. Peters, and Cox v. 
Peters, Judge Sloan refused to convene a three-judge court to hear 
it again. In an unreported opinion he reviewed the Court's hold-
ings in South, Colegrove v. Green, MacDougall, and Cox. "Upon 
a careful review of the authorities dealing with the question of 
subdivision of an election territory," he said, "the Court is of the 
opinion that the federal question sought to be raised here is un-
substantial for the reason that the previous decisions of the Su-
preme Court of the United States foreclose the subject and leave 
no room for inference that the question sought to be raised can 
be the subject of controversy."139 Following the method approved 
130 369 U.S. at 236. 
137 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
138 357 U.S. 916 (1958). 
130 Hartsfield v. Sloan, N.D. Ga. 1958 (unreported). 
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in Ex parte Poresky,140 the plaintiffs sought permission to file a 
writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court to require Judge Sloan 
to convene a three~udge court to hear the controversy. The peti-
tion was denied per curiam without opinion. The Chief Justice 
and Justices Black, Brennan, and Douglas were of the opinion 
that a rule to show cause should issue. The same four Justices were 
of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted, and it 
was.141 
Mr. Justice Brennan said of Hartsfield v. Sloan that, as in 
Remmey v. Smith,142 "problems of timing were critical. ... [M]ov-
ants urged the Court to advance consideration of their case, 'inas-
much as the mere lapse of time before this case can be reached 
in the normal course of . . . business may defeat the cause, and 
inasmuch as the time problem is due to the inherent nature of 
the case ... .' " 143 In the motion to advance, movants pointed out 
that they had brought the suit below as soon as the announcement 
had been made that there was to be a primary election at some 
date between then and the general election scheduled for Novem-
ber 1958. They had refrained from bringing it prior to that time 
because, since Georgia law did not require any primary to be held, 
they were afraid that a suit brought before the announcement that 
a primary election was to be held would have been subject to 
dismissal on the ground that it was prematurely brought. They 
pointed out that "despite the delay occasioned by this petition for 
mandamus the petitioner can still obtain effective relief if this 
Court grants the writ by the end of this term. The Georgia general 
election ballots need not be finally prepared until the last days of 
October 1958."144 In appraising the likelihood that Mr. Justice 
Brennan was correct in his interpretation of the meaning of the 
majority decision to decline to compel a hearing in Hartsfield, 
it is of interest that, despite this time factor, all of the three 
Justices who signed the Brennan opinion in Baker v. Garr voted 
to issue a rule to show cause in the Hartsfield case. Of the Court 
which heard Baker, only Justices Clark, Harlan, and Frankfurter 
were members of the majority in Hartsfield. In the Frankfurter 
dissenting opinion in Baker, joined in by Mr. Justice Harlan, the 
140 290 U.S. 30 (1933). See also ROBERTSON &: KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME 
OouRT OF THE UNITED STATES § 211 (2d ed. Wolfson&: Kurland 1951). 
141 Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958). 
142 342 U.S. 916 (1952). 
143 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 235. 
144 See Motion To Advance, p. 2, Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958). 
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case is cited as supporting the Colegrove doctrine,145 and in the 
Clark opinion the case is not mentioned by name but the opinion 
contains the following statement: "Finally, the Georgia county-
unit-system cases, such as South v. Peters ... reflect the viewpoint 
of MacDougall, i.e., to refrain from intervening where there is 
some rational policy behind the State's system."14~ 
The next, and last, of the pre-Baker apportionment cases was 
Matthews v. Handley.141 It involved an attack on the validity of 
the Indiana gross income tax statute on the ground that the act 
was adopted by a legislature elected under an unconstitutional 
apportionment statute. The form of the case shows the despera-
tion of the franchise reformers. Having lost in equity, mandamus, 
and common-law action for damages, they were undoubtedly seek-
ing to present a new wrinkle to the Court, probably not so much 
because they thought that their case could be distinguished from 
the many cases denying relief, as because they no doubt noted the 
facts that the Chief Justice and Justices Black, Brennan, and 
Douglas had voted to issue the rule to show cause in Hartsfield, 
and that between 1958 and 1961 Mr. Justice Stewart had replaced 
Mr. Justice Burton. Mr. Justice Burton's retirement left Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter the lone survivor of the original adherents to 
the latter's position in Colegrove v. Green. On the other hand, 
two of the original dissenters remained unconverted. 
The district court dismissed the suit in Matthews, but, while 
it was not disposed to hold that the Colegrove doctrine was in any 
sense weakened, it provided the Court with a possible excuse for 
not strengthening it by holding that in any event the state law 
provided an adequate means for testing the validity of the tax 
as applied to the plaintiffs, including the constitutionality of the 
statute. On appeal, the judgment of the district court was affirmed 
in a per curiam decision without opinion and without citation of 
authority. Mr. Justice Brennan took the affirmance to mean that 
where there is an adequate state procedure for testing the validity 
of a state statute, the federal courts will not enjoin its operation.148 
B. The Clark Opinion: Texans Shoot from the Hip 
Mr. Justice Clark ·agreed with his brother Brennan that the 
issues raised in Baker were part of a subject matter over which the 
145 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 279 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
140 Id. at 253 n.4 (Clark, J., concurring). 
147 361 U.S. 127 (1959). 
148 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 236. 
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federal courts have jurisdiction, and that they were not non-jus-
ticiable "political questions." He also joined the majority in send-
ing the case back for a decision on the merits. Left to himself to 
decide the case, he would have gone further and held for the plain-
tiffs on the merits. He was of the opinion that the majority in sub-
stance had done so, and he preferred to be straightforward about 
it. Where, as in Baker, judgments granting motions to dismiss are 
reversed on appeal, the normal procedure is to remand for trial so 
that the defendant can present any evidence he has, but, in cases 
in which the facts are not in dispute, there is precedent for final 
disposition of the cause by the appellate court.149 In the Baker 
case the facts were not in dispute. The case was not one of ur-
gency, however. Tennesseeans had waited half a century for re-
apportionment and they could not be said to be mightily incon-
venienced by the majority's insistence that defendants get an 
opportunity to present evidence before judgment is entered against 
them. 
If Mr. Justice Clark's objection was to the majority's pretenses 
that it was not deciding the merits of the constitutional claim un-
der the facts as admitted in the motion to dismiss, he was on sound 
ground. The case came up on admitted facts and the normal man-
ner of deciding it would have been to rule one way or another on 
the question of whether the pleadings stated a claim on which re-
lief could be granted.150 The majority disposition of the case left 
it undecided whether a claim was stated, and remanded, presum-
ably for a formal determination on that issue. Why such a remand 
was necessary or desirable escapes the ·writer completely. All it 
could accomplish would be to add to the Court's fund of lower 
court opinions on the merits of an argument already before it 
fifteen times. It is possible, but improbable, that an opinion from 
one more three-judge court would add any new insight. 
Since he would have decided the merits, it was necessary for 
Mr. Justice Clark to distinguish the cases which Mr. Justice Bren-
nan had disposed of in his opinion. Since with some differences in 
language most of them were given the same treatment, it is un-
necessary to go down the list, but the differences are worthy of 
mention. Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors151 and Colegrove v. 
Green152 were put aside because in those cases, said Mr. Justice 
149 See 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE CJ 41..13(2) (2d ed. 1951). 
150 5 id. CJ 41.13(1). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 4l(b). 
151 339 U.S. 940 (1950). 
152 328 U .s. 549 (1946). 
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Clark, the appellants did not argue the equal protection clause.153 
In the case of Tedesco, this may have been technically correct. At 
least the appellants did not mention that clause by that name. 
The claim was made under the due process clause and under the 
fourteenth amendment in general, so to speak. But the appellants' 
claim that the fourteenth amendment prohibited unequal appor-
tionment of the city was spoken of by the appellees as an equal 
protection claim, 154 and the appellants insisted in their summary 
of points that they were relying upon all of the first section of the 
fourteenth amendment.155 If it can be said that the appellants did 
not argue the equal protection clause, the truth of the assertion 
depends upon their failure to refer to the subject clause by its 
popular name. 
As applied to Colegrove v. Green, such a statement is palpably 
incorrect. In the complaint, assignments of error, the appellants' 
brief, and the amicus brief filed by the Better Government Asso-
ciation, reliance upon the equal protection clause fairly leaps at 
the reader.156 It is true that in the Frankfurter opinion the clause 
was not mentioned by name, the constitutional claims being 
lumped together as made under "various provisions of the United 
States Constitution."157 But in Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opin-
ion the equal protection claim was recited. Indeed, Mr. Justice 
Black's disagreement with the ultimate disposition of the case 
depended upon his belief that appellants had demonstrated a 
denial of equal protection of the laws.158 
153 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 252 (Clark, J., concurring). 
154 See Statement Opposing Jurisdiction and Motion To Dismiss or Affirm, p. 2, 
Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950): "He also would predicate a denial 
of equal protection of the laws on the circumstance that there is a disparity of electors 
in the electoral districts." 
155 See Brief for Appellant Opposing Motion of Appellees To Dismiss or Affirm, p. 4, 
Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950): "That appellant relies not only 
upon the first clause of the second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but upon the entire section." 
156 Sec Transcript of Record, Assignment of Errors, Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 
549 (1946): "The District Court erred in failing to hold that the ••• Act violates the 
rights of the plaintiffs under the 'privileges and immunities' clause, the 'due process' 
clause and the 'equal protection of the laws' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States." See Brief and Arguments for Appellants, p. 62, 
under heading: "The Illinois • • • Act Also Particularly Denies to the Appellants the 
Equal Protection of the Laws in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." See also 
Brief for the Better Government Association as Amicus Curiae, p. 36: "The Illinois 
Redistricting Act of 1901 which defendants seek to enforce creates such gross inequalities 
in the Congressional districts as to deny to plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
11.i7 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,550 (1946). 
158 Id. at 568: "The complaint attacked the 1901 Apportionment Act as unconsti-
tutional and alleged facts indicating that the Act denied appellants the full right to vote 
and the equal protection of the laws." 
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Mr. Justice Clark's mistake in this connection may be ex-
plained by his adherence to the view of Wood v. Broom160 espoused 
by the signers of the Brennan opinion. In putting aside the Frank-
furter language on "political questions" as no more than an alter-
native ground, he appended a footnote in which he said: "The 
opinion stated ... that the Court 'could also dispose of this case 
on the authority of Wood v. Broom . .. .' Wood v. Broom involved 
only the interpretation of a congressional reapportionment Act."160 
The reasoning seems to run from the assumption that Wood was 
a case not involving constitutional issues to the conclusion that 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's willingness to dispose of Colegrove v. 
Green on the authority of Wood demonstrates that Colegrove, too, 
involved no constitutional claim. There are two difficulties with 
this line of reasoning. First, in each case the claim rested both 
under the statute and under the equal protection clause. It is all 
very well to say that a policy against decision of constitutional 
issues unadorned by discussion leads the Court to treat as 
open the questions which have been disposed of in this way. It 
does not follow that the case did not involve a constitutional issue. 
Where in a second case the judge deems himself bound by the 
first, there are two possible inferences. The first is that the case 
did not involve a constitutional claim; the second, that the court 
in the second case took the first case to foreclose the constitutional 
as well as the statutory issue.161 Clearly the district court read the 
Wood case as ruling out both the statutory and constitutional 
claims in Colegrove v. Green, for it said: "In the absence of this 
decision we would assume that such a requirement [ of substantial 
equality of population in congressional districts] arose necessarily 
from the Constitution."162 When Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in 
Colegrove that "the District Court was clearly right in deeming 
itself bound by Wood v. Broom, ... and we could also dispose 
of this case on the authority of Wood v. Broom,"163 the statement 
was to be read against the statement by the lower court that it took 
Wood as precluding judicial vindication of a right the court would 
159 See text supra at 715. 
160 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 252 n.l. 
161 The latter was clearly the way Wood v. Broom was read by the Illinois Supreme 
Court in Daly v. County of Madison, 378 Ill. 357, 364, 38 N.E.2d 160, 164 (1941): 
"That there is nothing in the fourteenth amendment which would render invalid con-
gressional districts created by State legislation, on the ground that they are unequal in 
population, was settled by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Wood v. Broom .•.. " 
162 64 F. Supp. 632,634 (N.D. Ill. 1946). 
163 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,551 (1946). 
1963] LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 745 
have thought was constitutionally protected. Second, regardless 
of the inferences which might othenv-ise be drawn from the will-
ingness of Mr. Justice Frankfurter to dispose of the Colegrove case 
on the authority of Wood v. Broom, we know as a fact that in 
Colegrove the claim under the equal protection clause was urged 
upon the Court, and that the question of whether these claims 
were foreclosed by Wood v. Broom was argued by counsel.164 
The peculiar feature of this slip on the part of Mr. Justice 
Clark was the fact that the absence of an equal protection claim 
in Colegrove v. Green was wholly unnecessary to his willingness 
to set this case aside. He had already pointed out that the Frank-
furter view was not the prevailing one. Having hit his target the 
first time, he merely weakened his total argument by loosing this 
second hail of hip shots. 
Though willing to go further than his brethren in the dis-
position of the Baker case itself, the ground on which Mr. Justice 
Clark would have put the result is a narrow one. He said that he 
relied on MacDougall v. Green.165 That disposed of the arguments 
on jurisdiction and justiciability. But it is wholly inconsistent 
with the theory that the equal protection clause prohibits a state 
from apportioning political influence among its geographic sub-
divisions with an eye to density as well as number of inhabitants. 
And Mr. Justice Clark did not question this principle. But the 
present Tennessee apportionment struck him as outlandish enough 
to be classified as wholly arbitrary, and, as such, in violation of the 
Constitution. He noted that not only was there a great difference 
between large counties and small counties, but also among large 
counties and among small counties. In short, there was no rational 
pattern at all. He distinguished South v. Peters, in which he had 
joined the majority, as grounded upon the existence of a rational 
plan-six units for the largest counties, four for middle-sized 
counties, and two for small counties. It will be remembered that 
in South the plaintiffs pleaded that the difference in the repre-
sentation ratio as between the largest county and the smallest was 
one to one hundred and twenty-two.166 In MacDougall it was 
stated by the Court that the fifty-three smallest Illinois counties, 
with thirteen percent of the population, held an absolute veto 
over the creation of new parties by people in the remaining fifty 
164 See Brief and Argument for Appellants, p. 65, Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 
549 (1946). See also Brief by Better Government Association, p. 30. 
165 335 U.S. 281 (1948). 
166 See note 66 supra. 
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counties, with eighty-seven percent of the population.167 Nor was 
the veto mutual. The thirteen percent could fore~ a name on the 
ballot with no support among the eighty-seven percent. To Mr. 
Justice Clark, then, the line between constitutionality and uncon-
stitutionality is not a mathematical one, but one of reasonable 
classification. 
In its practical application the Clark view may have special, 
if not exclusive relevance to the case, like Baker, in which the 
alleged discriminations are the product of passage of time and 
shifts in population. In cases of conscious design apparently the 
usual presumptions of constitutionality make courts chary of say-
ing that a given pattern has no logic to support it, for, as Judge 
Janvier observed in Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, there may be 
groups, social and otherwise, 168 which the legislature thought 
should be represented. Whatever rational base the Court might 
think of as a possibility, it knows as a fact that the discrepancies in 
representation ratio as between Tennessee counties was not a mat-
ter of conscious design at all. It knows this because in 1901 the leg-
islature took as its criterion for distribution the straight population 
requirement of the Tennessee constitution and did a middling 
fair job of apportionment. 
The trouble with this view is that if the legislature may design 
a bracket structure which will afford the populous counties no 
more representation than they now enjoy, or under the South case 
less, the Clark decision in Baker avails them nothing. It would 
force elimination of the odd and crazy differences among smaller 
counties, but the residents of these counties have made no com-
plaint, and it seems strange to permit residents of Memphis, Nash-
ville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville to raise the question of whether 
residents of Washington County are afforded greater representa-
tion than those of Unicoi County if their own representation is 
within constitutionally permissible ranges. The net effect is to 
require that rural bias, to be constitutional, must be advertent, 
certainly a reverse twist on the role of intention in equal protec-
tion cases. 
C. The Douglas Opinion: Substantial Equality 
Mr. Justice Douglas, like his brother Clark, would have de-
cided the case on the merits. He would have done so, however, 
167 MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281,283 (1948). 
168 See Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for Parish of Orleans, 43 So. 
2d 514, 519 (La. Ct. App. 1949). 
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in the normal way, reversing the district court determination that 
the plaintiffs did not state a claim on which relief can be granted 
and remanding for a trial of the facts. 169 Since his views on the 
merits of the claim have been well knmvn for sixteen years,170 his 
opinion came as no surprise. This time, however, he took occa-
sion to serve notice that his conception of the role of courts in 
protecting the people against unfair operation of the political 
process does not stop with apportionment of representatives in the 
legislature. Conceding that there is a narrow range of political 
issues which are beyond judicial competence, he would confine 
them to cases in which discretionary duties are vested directly 
upon executive officers by the Constitution,171 and cases in which 
particular functions have been assigned "wholly and indivisibly" 
to another department.172 He indicated that his views led him to 
disagree_ with the decisions in Luther v. Borden113 and Georgia v. 
Stanton.114 
On the subject of the issues posed in Baker, Mr. Justice Doug-
las stated three limitations on the power of the states to apportion 
representation. First, the fifteenth amendment prevents discrimi-
nation based upon race. Second, the nineteenth amendment pre-
vents discrimination based upon sex. Third, the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits other "invidious 
discriminations." This left him with the necessity of showing that 
there had been alleged in Baker a discrimination which is "invid-
ious." 
"I agree with my Brother Clark that if the allegations in the 
complaint can be sustained a case for relief is established. 
We are told that a single vote in Moore County, Tennessee, 
is worth 19 votes in Hamilton County, that one vote in Stew-
art or in Chester County is worth nearly eight times a single 
vote in Shelby or Knox County. The opportunity to prove 
that an 'invidious discrimination' exists should therefore be 
given the appellants."175 
100 369 U.S. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
170 See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 566 (1946); MacDougall v. Green, 335 
U.S. 281, 287 (1948); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 
U.S. 912 (1952); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 
U.S. 339, 348 (1960). 
171 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860). See also 369 U.S. at 245. 
172 See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). See also 369 U.S. 
at 246. 
173 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); see 369 U.S. at 242 &: n.2. 
174 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867); see 369 U.S. at 246 &: n.3. 
175 369 U.S. at 245. 
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This observation leaves unspoken the criteria of invidiousness. In 
one breath it seems to say that having shown the order of differ-
ence to be nineteen to one and eight to one, a claim has been 
made on which relief can be granted. In the next, that the order 
of difference entitles the plaintiffs to no more than an opportunity 
to submit proof that the discrimination is an invidious one. As 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his dissent, Baker was not 
a case like Gomillion v. Lightfoot,176 in which the geographical 
classification was alleged to screen a difference of treatment made 
along other and prohibited lines. Since Mr. Justice Douglas con-
ceded that there "is room for weighting,''177 the "invidiousness" 
here must lie in the order of difference, rather than in the basis of 
the classification; unless, perhaps, he was suggesting, as Mr. Justice 
Clark did, that the question was one of utter lack of rational pat-
tern. Apparently it was the former. In a footnote it was stated 
that "the District Court need not undertake a complete reappor-
tionment. It might possibly achieve the goal of substantial equality 
merely by directing respondent to eliminate the egregious injus-
tices."178 This suggests that Mr. Justice Douglas did view the 
problem as one of order of difference. Absolute equality is not 
required, but substantial equality is. 
Taking this view of "invidiousness," it is surprising that Mr. 
Justice Douglas did not join his brother Clark in voting to dis-
pose of the case then and there, for certainly the order of the 
differences was not in dispute. Within Mr. Justice Clark's formu-
lation, it is conceivable that the defendants could suggest some 
possible rational basis or give some explanation which would con-
vince a court that the system was not completely chaotic, for, on 
the allegations alone, Mr. Justice Harlan was so convinced. If 
substantial equality is required, however, substantial equality 
there is not. What the plaintiffs are required to prove that is not 
a matter of record, Mr. Justice Douglas left unclear. 
Since he has frequently expressed his disagreement with the 
Colegrove line of cases, it comes as no surprise that he did not 
trouble himself with coining his own methods of disposing of 
them. He simply noted that the only impediment to relief in 
these cases has been the opinion in Colegrove, "and the cases it 
spawned," and that this impediment had been removed by what 
the Court had said about them. 
176 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
177 369 U.S. at 244-45. 
178 Id. at 250 n.5. 
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D. The Stewart Opinion 
"That is not it at all, 
"That isn't what I meant at all." 
T. S. Eliot 
Mr. Justice Clark suggested that the reader might emerge 
from the Court's six opinions suffering from mental blindness.170 
His brother Stewart attempted to avoid this result by simplifying 
and interpreting the Court's decision. It holds, said Mr. Justice 
Stewart, besides that appellants have standing, two things, and 
only two: first, that the issues posed in Baker are within the sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction of the district courts, and second, that they 
do not pose non-justiciable "political questions."180 
He scored Mr. Justice Douglas for suggesting that the Court 
was holding that there must be substantial equality of voting 
strength as between urban and rural areas, citing MacDougall as 
holding to the contrary. He spoke of Mr. Justice Clark's showing 
of the irrationality of the Tennessee system and Mr. Justice Har-
lan's defense of it as not to the point. "The merits of this case 
are not before us now," he continued, "the defendants have not 
yet had an opportunity to be heard in defense of the State's system 
of apportionment; indeed, they have not yet even filed an answer 
to the complaint. As in other cases, the proper place for the trial 
is in the trial court, not here."181 
This is a round-sounding phrase, but Baker v. Carr came to 
the Court on appeal from the judgment of the district court grant-
ing a motion to dismiss. Such a motion admits all facts prop€rly 
pleaded and contends that, even so, the complaint does not state 
a claim on which relief can be granted. Whether those facts can 
be proved is of course not before the appellate court. The merits 
of the constitutional claim are.182 It was only by narrowly constru-
ing the judgment of the district court that the majority was able to 
say with any plausibility at all that the merits were not before 
it.183 The district court construed the Colegrove lines of cases as 
holding that, under the facts alleged, no claim had been stated 
on which relief could be granted.184 It was reversed, and its judg-
170 369 U.S. at 251 (Clark, J., concurring). 
180 Id. at 265 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
181 Id. at 266. 
182 See 5 Mooiu:, op. cit. supra note 149. 
183 See 369 U.S. at 195-98. 
184 See Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. at 826. 
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ment vacated.185 Presumably, however, the merits of the consti-
tutional question could then be raised by another motion to 
dismiss, rather than by a trial, or even an answer to the complaint, 
so it does not answer Justices Clark and Douglas, and the dissent-
ers, to say the merits were not before the Court because a trial 
had not been held. Given the posture of the case, a trial was not 
necessary, and the rules provide such procedure for the express 
purpose of avoiding unnecessary trials. 
E. The Majority: You Can't Tell the Players 
Without a Scorecard 
It remains to piece together the view of the Court's present 
personnel on the central question-the effect of the equal pro-
tection clause on the power of the state to distribute representa-
tion among its geographical subdivisions. 
The one thing that is clear is that the Court was of the opinion 
that the question is within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
district court, and is not a non-justiciable "political question."186 
This holding is supported by six members, a comfortable majority, 
and unaffected by intervening changes in the make-up of the 
Court. 
On the merits of the particular claim in the Baker case, the 
situation is not quite clear. The Brennan opinion purported not 
to decide the issue, but then proceeded to say in a footnote: "Since 
we hold that the appellants have-if it develops at trial that the 
facts support the allegations-a cognizable federal constitutional 
cause of action .... "187 Further, we know the views of Mr. Justice 
Black because of his dissenting opinion in Colegrove v. Green and 
because he joined the dissent in MacDougall v. Green and in 
South v. Peters. It is probable, therefore, that a majority of five-
Justices Black, Brennan, Clark, Douglas, and the Chief Justice-
would hold for the appellants on the merits, Mr. Justice Harlan 
dissenting and Justices Goldberg, Stewart, and White yet to be 
heard from. 
On the constitutional requirement of substantial equality of 
representation, the position of Mr. Justice Douglas is clear, and, 
from previous dissenting opinions, we know that his view is shared 
by Mr. Justice Black. On the other hand, the suggestion that rural 
bias is unconstitutional as such was expressly rejected by Justices 
185 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
186 But see text infra at 790. 
187 369 U.S. at 195 n.15. 
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Clark and Stewart. Even if the Brennan opinion can be taken as 
placing its adherents on the side of Justices Clark and Douglas 
on the merits of the particular claim, it gave no hint at all as to 
whether the reason lies in the general irrationality of the scheme 
(a la Clark), or is grounded in the belief that rural bias is pro-
scribed (a la Douglas). All that can be said is that at least two, 
and perhaps four, of the members of the Court share this position, 
and that three-] ustices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart-do not. This 
leaves the issue in the hands of the newly-appointed Justices Gold-
berg and White, who could determine a majority either way. 
So after thirty years of litigation, twelve years of silence and 
50,000 words, the application of the equal protection clause to 
problems of apportionment is still in great doubt, in extent if not 
in fact. 
F. The Frankfurter Opinion: A Parting Thrust 
at the New Court 1'.1ilitant 
The Colegrove doctrine was not buried without accusation 
that it was the victim of foul play. Mr. Justice Clark referred to the 
Frankfurter opinion as "go[ing] through so much and conclud[ing] 
with so little,"188 a clever piece of persiflage, perhaps, but hardly 
apt. The conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Frankfurter were 
plain enough. They were three in number. The first had to do 
with judicial precedent. Though he spoke of the appellants when 
he said, "It would only darken counsel to discuss the relevance and 
significance of each of these assertedly distinguishing factors here 
and in the context of this entire line of cases,"189 a reader having 
gone through what Justices Brennan and Clark had to say about 
these cases can scarcely resist the conclusion that their brother 
Frankfurter's barb had struck home. For certainly the conclusion 
that a bald claim of difference in representation ratio as between 
geographical subdivisions is not such a claim as will support equi-
table relief fairly screams from the apportionment cases decided by 
the Court in the past thirty years. The attempts to distinguish 
all of them, resting as they do upon tissue-thin distinctions, and 
in some cases upon distinctions which are in fact simply not pres-
ent, are little better than a shell game. Assuming that there is 
any such constitutional right, the concession that for thirty years 
the Court has refused to enforce it on the divers grounds sug-
188 369 U.S. at 251. 
1so Id. at 280. 
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gested by Mr. Justice Brennan is enough to shake the confidence 
of the most staunch of the Court's admirers. That the majority 
opinion, if it be read from the footnote rather than the text,190 
flies in the teeth of the precedents, is so plain that it is not even 
arguable. There have been variations in parlance, to be sure, but 
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out: 
"If the weight and momentum of an unvarying course of 
carefully considered decisions are to be respected, appellants' 
claims are foreclosed not only by precedents governing the ex-
act facts of the present case but are themselves supported by 
authority the more persuasive in that it gives effect to the 
Colegrove principle in distinctly varying circumstances in 
which state arrangements allocating relative degrees of polit-
ical influence among geographic groups of voters were chal-
lenged under the Fourteenth Amendment."191 
The second conclusion dealt with the application of the "po-
litical question" doctrine to the facts of the Baker case. Like the 
majority, Mr. Justice Frankfurter had some cases to distinguish, 
for it could not be gainsaid that in Smiley v. H olm,192 Koenig v. 
Flynn,193 Carroll v. Becker,194 McPherson v. Blacker, 196 and Mac-
Dougall v. Green,196 the Court did adjudicate matters dealing with 
apportionment, and in the cases dealing with alleged Negro dis-
franchisement the Court had not hesitated to interfere to protect 
a right to equal enfranchisement. In one of them, Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot,191 it had gone as far as in effect to change the boundaries 
of a city. 
Smiley, Koenig, and Carroll were ail distinguished as cases in 
which the Court freed the states from supposed limitations under 
the Constitution. In such cases, suggested Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 
there were no problems "demanding the accommodation of con-
flicting interests for which no readily accessible judicial standards 
could be found."198 In McPherson v. Blacker, too, though the 
Court treated as justiciable the question of whether a state could 
190 As, indeed, it undoubtedly can, since the decision in "\\T.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 370 
U.S. 190 (1962); see discussion of the Simon case infra at 762-64. 
191 369 U.S. at 280 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
102 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
193 285 U.S. 375 (1932). 
194 285 U.S. 380 (1932). 
195 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
196 335 U.S. 281 (1948). 
197 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
198 369 U.S. at 285. 
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provide for the election of its presidential electors from districts, 
it held that the method of choosing such electors was left in the 
absolute discretion of the state. "To read with literalness the ab-
stracted jurisdictional discussion in the McPherson opinion," said 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "reveals the danger of conceptions of 
'justiciability' derived from talk and not from the effective deci-
sion in a case."199 The Negro disfranchisement cases were dis-
tinguished as resting upon a clear constitutional imperative under 
the fifteenth amendment, and "no less" under the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth.200 
This ·writer is on record as suggesting that framing the issues 
posed in the apportionment cases in terms of what sorts of contro-
versies are "justiciable" and what are not only serves to confuse 
them.201 In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, for instance, Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter said that the violation of the fifteenth amendment 
"[lifts] this controversy out of the so-called 'political' arena into 
the conventional sphere of constitutional litigation."202 Conceding 
that the problem may be thus described without changing the 
outcome, it is suggested that consideration in these terms ulti-
mately requires a determination on the merits of the existence or 
non-existence of the constitutional right asserted in the claim. If 
so, is it not better to proceed directly to that problem? In the 
Gomillion case, would it not have been more precise to say that 
in the apportionment cases the plaintiffs asserted a right to equality 
of representation by population, a right not vouchsafed to them 
by the fourteenth amendment, while in Gomillion it was alleged 
that the statute in question infringed the plaintiffs' right not to be 
treated differently because of their race, a right which is vouch-
safed to them by the fifteenth? As Mr. Justice Harlan said in 
his dissenting opinion in Baker, an opinion in which Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter joined, one asks the same questions to determine the 
existence of the right under the fourteenth amendment that would 
be asked in determining the existence of a "political question" 
said to be non-justiciable.203 
Nor is the language of constitutional substance absent from 
any of the Frankfurter opinions. In Gomillion, for example, he 
100 Id. at 285. 
200 Id. at 285-86. 
201 See Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1961 
SUPREME COURT REv. 194, 223. 
202 364 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1960). 
203 369 U.S. at 337 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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distinguished the line of cases, such as Hunter v. City of Pitts-
burgh,204 in which the Court had refused to interfere with the 
state's free exercise of the power to create political subdivisions 
and define their boundaries and powers, by pointing out that in 
these cases the infringement complained of was grounded on an 
asserted right to equality of taxation and a right to continued 
exercise of delegated powers, neither of which is guaranteed under 
the Constitution. And in his opinion in Colegrove v. Green, he 
began by saying that the case could be disposed of under Wood v. 
Broom. In MacDougall v. Green, he joined in an opinion which 
held squarely that the fourteenth amendment did not prohibit 
allocation of political influence disproportionate to population. 
This brings us to the third conclusion. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter determined that the claim in the Baker case did not charge 
a violation of the equal protection clause. The essence of the 
claim, he stated, was the assertion that "the equality which [the 
equal protection clause] guarantees comports, if not the assurance 
of equal weight to every voter's vote, at least the basic conception 
that representation ought to be proportionate to population, a 
standard by reference to which the reasonableness of apportion-
ment plans may be judged." To find such a requirement legally 
enforceable in "the broad and unspecific guarantee of equal pro-
tection is to rewrite the Constitution."205 The trouble with ap-
pellants' assertion that the principle of representation pro-
portioned to the geographic spread of population is "the basic 
principle of representative government," said Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, "is, to put it bluntly, [that it is] not true."206 
Is there a difference, then, between saying that, as a general 
proposition matters of politics are not justiciable, but, when the 
rights asserted are guaranteed by other provisions of the Consti-
tution, the fact that they are so guaranteed lifts the controversy 
out of the "political arena" and "into the conventional sphere of 
constitutional litigation," on the one hand, and on the other saying 
simply that the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution does 
not establish such a right? Both approaches leave the result to 
depend upon the existence of the right under the "other provi-
sions of the Constitution." But when we talk about non-justicia-
bility, we pretend not to have considered whether or not the right 
204 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
205 369 U.S. at 300. 
206 Id. at 301. 
1963] LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 755 
exists, when in fact we have. The different treatment accorded 
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon201 in the Brennan and 
Frankfurter opinions illustrates this point. In this case attack 
was made on the constitutionality of an Oregon license tax statute 
on the ground that it was enacted by initiative act, in violation, it 
was alleged, of the "republican form of government" clause, the 
due process clause, and the equal protection clause. The Court 
held that the matter was not justiciable under the guaranty clause 
and that allegations of violation of the fourteenth amendment did 
not add anything to the complaint. Mr. Justice Brennan said of 
the Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. case that the due process and 
equal protection claims were held non-justiciable not because 
they were joined with a guaranty clause claim, "but because the 
Court believed that they were invoked merely in verbal aid of the 
resolution of issues which, in its view, entailed political questions . 
. . . We conclude then that the nonjusticiability of claims resting 
on the Guaranty Clause which arises from their embodiment of 
questions that were thought 'political,' can have no bearing upon 
the justiciability of the equal protection claim presented in this 
case .... "208 In the Frankfurter opinion, the same case was used 
to show that one cannot lift an attack upon the general organiza-
tion of a state into a justiciable question by attaching an equal 
protection label to the claim.209 
The reason that the Baker case fell outside the rationale of 
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co., to Mr. Justice Brennan, was that 
he had already decided that the claim stated a case of individual 
deprivation under the equal protection clause, and that clause was 
not invoked merely as a verbal aid to a claim which alleged only 
the general unrepublican character of the state's government. To 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, it fell within the case precedent because 
there was charged only "that the frame of government is askew" ;210 
in short, because there was stated no individual deprivation cog-
nizable under the equal protection clause. The equal protection 
claim became, then, merely an effort to pull up a guaranty clause 
claim by the bootstraps. 
Mr. Justice Harlan suggested that the majority was confused 
by the framing of the issues in terms of justiciability, rather than 
in terms of what states a cause of action under the equal protec-
201 22!1 U.S. 118 (1912). 
208 Baker v. Carr, !169 U.S. at 228. 
200 Id. at 290-92. 
210 Id. at 299. 
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tion clause.211 The writer suggests that the majority may not be 
so much confused as willing to employ confusion inherent in this 
manner of speaking as a wedge for introduction of their own 
views of the merits the unadorned statement of which would be 
even more flatly opposed to the precedents. 
G. The Harlan Opinion: A Straightforward Answer 
to a Straight/ orward Question 
In his dissenting opinion, joined in by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 
Mr. Justice Harlan said, "once one cuts through the thicket of 
discussion devoted to 'jurisdiction,' 'standing,' 'justiciability,' and 
'political question,' there emerges a straightforward issue which, 
in my view, is determinative of this case. Does the complaint dis-
close a violation of a federal constitutional right, in other words, 
a claim over which a United States District Court would have 
jurisdiction. . . ?"212 He went on to say that he found nothing 
in the equal protection clause or elsewhere in the federal consti-
tution which expressly or impliedly supports the view that state 
legislatures need be structured so as to reflect approximate equality 
of the voice of every voter, and thought the matter settled in Mac-
Dougall v. Green213 and reaffirmed in South v. Peters.214 If no 
such requirement can be read from the Constitution, the only 
other contention present in the claim is that the Tennessee scheme 
of apportionment is so whimsical and arbitrary as to violate the 
equal protection clause without reference to a requirement that 
apportionment be substantially equal. 
Rationality of apportionment schemes, said Mr. Justice Har-
lan, cannot be determined by the application of arithmetic sym-
bols, there being many factors other than population which might 
have influenced the legislature in its allocation of seats. Without 
regard to these factors, he was able to see a pattern in the T ennes-
see system, with what he referred to as "slight disparities between 
rural areas." 
Legislative inaction Mr. Justice Harlan took to be as surely 
an exercise of legislative power as action.215 In letting the appor-
tionment stay the way it was, the legislative policy was plainly to 
retain the rural representation, regardless of shifts in population. 
211 Id. at 331. 
212 Id. at 330-31 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
213 335 U.S. 281 (1948). 
214 339 U.S. 276 (1950). 
215 369 U.S. at 336. 
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Apparently referring to Mr. Justice Clark, he suggested that at 
least some of the majority conceded that rural bias would not of 
itself be unconstitutional.216 He did not see that it was more so 
by virtue of the fact that the legislature of Tennessee had accom-
plished it by refusing to reapportion. 
II. SCHOLLE v. HARE 
Scholle v. Hare,211 decided one month after Baker v. Carr, 
involved an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Michigan dismissing an original action of mandamus brought to 
challenge the validity of a 1952 amendment to the Michigan con-
stitution fixing permanent state senate districts.218 It was con-
tended that the amendment, adopted at the general election of 
1952 by a margin of 300,000 votes, violated the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, in that it 
established an unreasonable and arbitrary distribution of state 
senators among senate districts established in the amendment 
itself. 
Prior to the adoption of the 1952 amendment, the state con-
stitution required senate representation according to popula-
tion.219 Under its provisions the Michigan legislature had divided 
the state into thirty-two senate districts, each electing one senator. 
There had not been a reapportionment of the legislature in Mich-
igan since 1925, then relying on the 1920 census. As in Illinois 
and in Tennessee, there had been significant shifts in population 
since that time, and 1950 found a variation in population between 
the largest and smallest districts of 8.9 to 1. The plaintiff lived 
in the twelfth district which was the second largest, with 8. 7 times 
the population of the smallest. The effect of the 1952 amendment 
was to increase the total number of senators elected to thirty-four, 
210 Id. at 340. 
211 369 U.S. 429 (1962). 
218 MICH. CONST. art V, § 2, as amended (1952). 
210 MICH. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1908). This provision read: "The Senate shall consist 
of thirty-two members. Senators shall be elected for two years and by single districts. 
Such districts shall be numbered from one to thirty-two, inclusive, each of which shall 
choose one senator. No county shall be divided in the formation of senatorial districts, 
unless such county shall be equitably entitled to two or more senators." In § 3 of the 
same article, provision was made for districts in the house of representatives, "which 
shall contain as nearly as may be an equal number of inhabitants .••• " On the basis 
of the language employed, it could be argued that the Michigan constitution did not 
require apportionment of senators according to population. The Supreme Court of 
Michigan read the last sentence of § 2 as requiring such apportionment. See Williams 
v. Secretary of State, 145 Mich. 447, 108 N.W. 749 (1906), under a former provision, and 
0Ps. An'Y GEN. MICH. 246, 248 (1923-1924); id. at 81 (1925-1926). 
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to remove the constitutional requirement of decennial apportion-
ment, and to make two small changes in the districts as they existed 
under the act of 1925. Lapeer and St. Clair counties were sepa-
rated from the eleventh district (formerly Macomb, Lapeer, and 
St. Clair) and made into a separate district (the thirty-fourth), and 
Washtenaw County was severed from the twelfth (Oakland and 
Washtenaw), and became the thirty-third. 
During the period between 1925 and the filing of the action in 
Scholle v. Hare, the Michigan legislature had twice reapportioned 
the seats in the lower house.220 Under the present apportionment 
of the lower house, Oakland County, the county in which the 
plaintiff resided, is given six seats of the 110 provided for in the 
reapportionment act of 1953. This apportionment presumably 
rests on the census of 1950, according to which Oakland had 
396,001 inhabitants. On a population basis, Oakland would be 
entitled to six and a major fraction representatives. It can be said, 
then, that as far as Oakland County goes, it was given roughly 
proportional representation in the lower house. The problem in 
the Scholle case was therefore different from the one posed in 
Baker v. Carr, where the legislature had permitted the represen-
tation ratio in both houses to reach a high point in rural bias. 
The obvious bargain dravm in Michigan was to freeze the senate 
seats on a geographical basis, but retain the popular representation 
in the lower house, in effect giving the rural areas a veto on state 
legislation. The cases also differ in that in Baker v. Carr the inac-
tion of the legisl~ture was in contravention of the provisions of 
the state constitution, while in Scholle v. Hare the scheme was 
provided for in the state constitution itself. 
By a five-to-three vote, the Supreme Court of Michigan denied 
the relief sought. The court was split into several factions. Four 
of the eight members thought that there was no infraction of the 
equal protection clause. Three thought that there was. The re-
maining member, Justice Black, was of the opinion that there was 
a violation of the equal protection clause, but, under the appor-
tionment cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
it was beyond the power of the Michigan Supreme Court to 
correct it. 
The members of the minority were of the opinion that there 
was no occasion to go into whether or not there is a constitution-
ally protected right to exact representation by population, for, like 
220 M1cH. CoMP. LAws ch. 2, § 3 (Mason Supp. 1943). 
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Mr. Justice Clark later, in regard to the Tennessee apportionment 
scheme, they saw complete lack of rational pattern. They distin-
guished the case of the United States Senate apportionment in the 
federal constitution as a representation of pre-existing sovereign 
units. In the Michigan system, on the other hand, they took the 
districts to be simple creation of arbitrary lines. 
The Scholle case was decided on appeal by an eight-man Su-
preme Court.221 A majority of five members delivered a five-line 
per curiam opinion, remanding the case to the Supreme Court of 
Michigan for reconsideration in the light of what had been said 
by the Court in Baker v. Carr. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented.222 He 
argued that four of the Michigan justices, enough to control the 
eight-man court, had held that there was no violation of the equal 
protection clause in the context of the facts of the case, without 
so much as mentioning the problem of jurisdiction or justiciability 
of the issues, leaving before the Supreme Court the single issue 
of whether or not the Michigan court was right in its decision on 
the merits. Justices Clark and Stewart concurred with the ma-
jority disposition of the case, but noted that had they agreed with 
their brother Harlan that the basis of the Michigan Supreme Court 
decision was on the merits, they might well have agreed to decide 
the merits without first remanding. In their view, only three of 
the five members voting to dismiss placed their decision on ab-
sence of the constitutional violation. All but these three, they 
believed, "were convinced that, whatever the underlying merits 
of the appellant's Equal Protection claim, it was, in the words of 
one of the justices, 'not enforcible in the courts.' "223 The quota-
tion is, of course, from the opinion of Justice Black (of the Mich-
igan Supreme Court), the fifth and doubting member of the 
majority.224 Since it was not necessary to have Justice Black's vote 
to dispose of the cause, one must believe also that Justice Edwards 
read the federal cases to hold absence of jurisdiction or justicia-
bility before one can agree with Justices Clark and Stewart. As 
Mr. Justice Harlan suggested, this is quite difficult. 
The case was decided by a majority of five, so the votes of 
Justices Clark and Stewart were not needed, and the significance 
of their concurring opinion lies only in whatever hint it gives of 
their views as to the extent of the holding in the Baker case. We 
221 Mr. Justice 'Whittaker took no part in the decision. 
222 369 U.S. at 430 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
223 Ibid. 
224 Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W .2d 63 (1960). 
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already know the views of Mr. Justice Stewart, for he made them 
explicit in his Baker opinion. Mr. Justice Clark, on the other 
hand, had said that in Baker, "The majority appears to hold, 
at least sub silentio, that an invidious discrimination is pres-
ent .... " 225 Since Mr. Justice Douglas agreed with Clark's view 
that a case of invidious discrimination had been made out, there 
may have been a clear majority for that position. In joining his 
brother Stewart in Scholle, remanding solely on the ground that 
the Michigan Supreme Court may have decided that case under 
the influence of the non-justiciability doctrine, he seemed to be 
willing to go along with the Stewart view of the narrow holding 
in Baker.226 
The role of Mr. Justice White is of interest, for, as noted 
earlier, his views and those of Mr. Justice Goldberg could deter-
mine the Court's ultimate decision, even if it is assumed, with 
Mr. Justice Stewart, that the merits were not determined in Baker. 
He was not on the Court when the Baker case was decided, and 
may have thought it better to put off consideration of Scholle until 
the next term to avoid a decision by another "bobtailed" Court, 
in view of the legacy of dispute left by both Colegrove221 and 
Baker. On the merits of the Scholle claim, it is interesting to 
speculate on the outcome. Under Mr. Justice Douglas's require-
ment of substantial equality of representation flowing from the 
equal protection clause, a good case can be made that the repre-
sentation of the plaintiff in the Michigan senate is not "substan-
tially equal," the ratio between top and bottom being approxi-
mately 6.5 to 1. There remains, however, the fact that plaintiff's 
representation in the lower house is approximately equal. The 
counties comprising the smallest senate district have a total 1.75 
lower house representatives for a population of 61,008, while Oak-
land has six representatives for a population of 396,001. So there is 
still nearly a two-to-one difference in the number of persons rep-
resented by one seat. On the other hand, the statewide proportion 
is one seat per 57,925 persons, so the Oakland representation in 
the lower house is within a fraction of that. As to the lower house, 
then, his claim, if any, would have to be that there are other coun-
ties which are under-represented, or that substantial equality in-
cludes some particular major fraction rule. This leaves the plain-
tiff's claim as one of under-representation in one house, an issue 
225 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 261. 
226 Id. at 265. 
221 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
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not posed in any of the cases, and one on which Mr. Justice Doug-
las has not had occasion to express himself. 
From the fact that they have joined in dissent down through 
the years, it may be assumed that Justices Black and Douglas can 
be counted together. Mr. Justice Clark, on the other hand, placing 
his vote in Baker on the existence of a completely whimsical clas-
sification, and distinguishing South v. Peters on the existence of 
logical pattern, might find pure whimsy in Michigan, or might 
not. The overall plan of giving popular representation in one 
house and geographical representation in the other is, of course, 
the federal pattern. The view of the dissenters in Scholle v. Hare 
that the state case is distinguishable from the federal pattern be-
cause of the fact that in the national government representation 
was given to existing sovereign units, whereas the definition of 
senate districts in Michigan was a mere ipse dixit of the amend-
ment is not exactly borne out by the facts. With the exception of 
two changes, these are the districts which have existed for thirty-
two years. Since the term of office under the Michigan constitu-
tion is two years, this means that the people in the various districts 
have pitched their political organization according to these dis-
trict lines for sixteen elections. This alone appears to give selec-
tion of these districts plausibility. Nor do the two changes detract 
from the reasonableness of this selection. In both cases, districts 
are split in two by separating out counties deemed to require 
individual seats in the senate. The plaintiff is in a particularly 
poor position to argue that the changes contribute to whimsy, 
because his is one of the counties selected for such increase in rep-
resentation. Further, Mr. Justice Clark seemed impressed by the 
crazy-quilt pattern in Tennessee, where some single counties had 
representatives, some had only influence in electing representatives 
in larger districts, and some had both. In Michigan there is no 
such complex overlapping of districts. There are thirty-four dis-
tricts, each separate from the others. The thirty-four include the 
whole state. Of course it is true that they are not all single-county 
districts, but, since there are thirty-four senators and eighty-three 
counties, this seems to be necessary. Except in Wayne, no county 
is split, and in no instance are county lines crossed in drawing 
district boundaries. The obvious convenience in the design of 
county election machinery no doubt relieves this pattern from the 
area of mere whim, and, conceding that, the design of districts 
which will not cross county lines is bound to involve some degree 
of difference in representation ratio. 
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III. W.M.C.A. V. SIMON 
The third of the 1962 Supreme Court decisions relating to 
legislative apportionment was W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon,228 a suit 
brought to invalidate the New York apportionment of both house 
and senate made under provisions of the New York state consti-
tution. These provisions are different from those in Tennessee 
in that the asserted rural bias is required by the constitution itself, 
and different from those in Michigan in that in New York no 
districts are directly defined. The General Assembly is called upon 
to apportion according to a formula set out in the constitution. 
The formula for the house allots one representative for each of 
the state's sixty-two counties, regardless of population, an addi-
tional member for each county which has more than a ratio and 
a half, and the balance are distributed to the counties having the 
highest remainder in the order thereof.229 The formula for the 
fifty-member senate requires the creation of fifty districts in which 
no county shall be split, except for the purpose of creating two or 
more districts within the same county, and provides that the dis-
tricts so created shall be as nearly as practicable compact and con-
tiguous and of equal population. The only limitation on the pop-
ulation basis of senate apportionment is the provision that no 
county shall have four or more senators unless it has a full ratio 
for each. 230 
The Simon case presents an interesting comparison with Baker 
and Scholle. In terms of the order of difference of the representa-
tion ratio as between rural and urban counties, Simon presented 
almost as striking a cas,e as that demonstrated in Baker, and greater 
differences than were shmm in Scholle. The smallest representa-
tive district, Schuyler County, has a population of 14,066, and the 
largest, in Bronx County, I 15,000. In the senate the range is from 
146,666 to 344,547. On the other hand, the integrity of county 
representation being preserved, it cannot be said that, as in Ten-
nessee, districts designed in the first instance to reflect population 
have lost that element of rationality by the passage of time and 
shifts in population, without taking on any other advertent hall-
mark of reasonable classification, or, as in Michigan, that the dis-
tricts represent the coupling of counties in unexplainable fashion. 
The case was heard by a three-judge court which held in a 
22s 370 U.S. 190 (1962). 
229 N.Y. CoNsr. art. III, §§ 2-5. 
230 Id. § 4. 
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two-to-one decision that there was here no irrationality which 
would invalidate the New York system.231 The third judge, Judge 
Waterman of the Second Circuit, did not pass on this point but 
voted to dismiss the bill on the ground that the matter was not 
justiciable. 232 
On appeal, the Supreme Court followed the pattern estab-
lished in the Scholle case, remanding for reconsideration in light 
of the opinion in Baker v. Carr. The opinion was short and per 
curiam. As in the Scholle case, the majority consisted of Justices 
Black, Brennan, Clark, Douglas, Stewart, White, and Chief Justice 
Warren. This time there were no concurring opinions. Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter took no part in the decision and Mr. Justice Har-
lan dissented. The decision in the Simon case adds little or noth-
ing to that in Scholle v. Hare; the Court referred to its "well-
established practice of a remand for consideration in the light 
of a subsequent decision."233 Mr. Justice Harlan felt that two of 
the three judges on the three-judge court had decided the matter 
on the merits and the Supreme Court should proceed to the cor-
rectness of the decision. As in Scholle v. Hare, he objected to 
referring the case back to the district court for reconsideration 
without providing any guidelines for decision on the merits. 
The majority read the three opinions below as resting, one on 
the ground of failure to state a claim, lack of equity, and lack of 
justiciability, the second on absence of an allegation of discrimi-
nation against a particular racial or religious group, and the third 
on absence of a justiciable question. "As in Scholle v. Hare ... ," 
said the Court, "we believe that the court below should be the 
first to consider the merits of the federal constitutional claim, 
free from any doubts as to its justiciability and as to the merits 
of alleged arbitrary and invidious geographical discrimination."234 
The last phrase serves to cast a small ray of light on the Court's 
Baker decision. In saying that remand will provide consideration 
without doubt about "the merits of alleged arbitrary and invidious 
geographical discrimination," the Court interprets the Baker de-
cision as deciding that an allegation of "arbitrary and invidious" 
geographical discrimination states a claim under the equal pro-
tection clause, and not simply that the question is a justiciable 
one. It gives no hint of the Court's view as to what invidious or 
arbitrary geographical discrimination might be. 
231 W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 202 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
232 Id. at 755. 
233 W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190, 191 (1962). 
234 Ibid. 
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Taken together, Baker v. Carr, Scholle v. Hare, and W.M.C.A., 
Inc. v. Sirnon have made geographically-based differences in repre-
sentation ratio a matter of judicial cognizance under the equal 
protection clause, irrespective of a showing of discrimination as 
to race or sex. There is nothing very shocking about this. If the 
geographical basis of the classification will not protect it from 
judicial scrutiny in the case of tJ.ie fifteenth amendment violation, 
there seems to be no reason why it should in the case of violation 
of the fourteenth. Were a gerrymander based upon race, the same 
problems of adequate relief would present themselves. Nor is 
this decision inconsistent with the precedents. Conceding that the 
fourteenth amendment is applicable, however, it remains to apply 
to the geographical representation cases the ordinary principles of 
equal protection clause litigation. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
A. The Nature of the Right to Representation: 
Poll or Point of View 
This writer has suggested that division of a state into geograph-
ical subdivisions is always more of method than of substance, and 
any attempt to gauge the fairness or constitutionality of such a 
division should look to the underlying right.235 This principle 
is illustrated by the method the Court employed in Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot236 to distinguish Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh.231 The 
essence of the complaint in Hunter, said the Court, per Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter, was that if the plaintiff's property were by merger of 
municipal governments brought within the city of Pittsburgh, he 
would have to pay higher taxes. The Court said, "[I]f one prin-
ciple clearly emerges from the numerous decisions of this Court 
dealing with taxation it is that the Due Process Clause affords no 
immunity against mere inequalities in tax burdens, nor does it 
afford protection against their increase as an indirect consequence 
of a State's exercise of its political powers."238 In Gomillion, on 
the other hand, there was no assertion that there existed "mere 
inequality" of voting strength, but an inequality based upon the 
race of the plaintiffs. Turning to the underlying right to vote, 
the definition of such a right depends ultimately upon one's con-
235 See Lucas, supra note 201. 
236 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
237 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
238 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343 (1960). 
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ception of th~ nature and operation of republican government. 
One simple and straightforward theory of democracy is grounded 
upon the assumption that majorities can in any event control by 
force. If one leaves decisions to force, there is a certain risk to life 
and limb in determining which group constitutes a majority. 
Therefore we count them first and avoid the bloodshed. In other 
words, we count polls rather than crack them. Where the entire 
population votes, as where issues are put to referendum, there is 
a certain validity to this view. Every person is taken to be the 
only true authority on his own self-interest and the role of the 
election official is not to question a man's vote, but to count it. 
The result has at least the virtue of representing the will of a 
majority of the population. Even here, a line can be drawn be-
tween minority rule and the requirement tliat action await more 
than a simple majority. Our tradition is replete with examples of 
the preference for inaction until the advent of a degree of con-
sensus greater than fifty-one to forty-nine.239 
Representative government adds a completely new dimension. 
There is no direct connection between the views of the legal rep-
resentative of a particular poll, and those of its owner. This is 
true because, on any given issue, the views of a voter may be mi-
nority views locally. Indeed in any representative district there 
are to be found those who talked, worked, and voted against the 
legal representative. It is possible, for instance, that there are Mis-
sissippi voters who consider that a Javits or a Morse represents 
them better than an Eastland, or Illinois residents who consider 
a Byrd represents their point of view better than a Douglas. On 
the federal level the fact that some of the representation units are 
previously sovereign entities is a complicating factor because there 
are venerable loyalties to the state as a political unit. Even here, 
however, interest groups span state lines and the national manage-
ment of major party efforts makes the lines even hazier. At the 
local level there are some local loyalties, to cities or towns, or to 
counties or regions. They are much less fixed, however, and it 
seems fair to say that there are few voters who identify their in-
terests as primarily tied up with groups wholly within the city 
or county. 
The problem of design in a representative system, then, is one 
of insuring representation to a wide variety of interests and points 
of view, rather than insuring simply that as a formal matter every 
239 See Lucas, Book Review, 27 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 791, 792-93 (1960). 
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person cast a vote for the same number of representatives, whether 
or not he has any appreciable influence in the election of any of 
them. Conceivably this could be done by a system which would 
identify interest groups and allot them representation directly: 
rich man, poor man, beggar man, thief. A scheme of proportional 
representation in a multi-party system might approximate this 
approach. It would raise perhaps more problems than it would 
solve, however, so recourse has generally been had to indirect 
methods of insuring interest representation. 
The most workable indirect alternative is, of course, geograph-
ical districts. The assumption is that like people are apt to live 
contiguously, or at least that different areas of the state live with 
different problems, with all of which the state must deal, and that 
rational decision on these affairs is aided by the presence of rep-
resentatives who have lived with them. Representative assemblies 
are, after all, only partially devices for measuring popular will; 
they are also deliberative in nature. It is assumed that when the 
views of a wide sampling of the public have been aired and dis-
cussed, action will result or not, according to rational consensus. 
This is not to say that there may not be issues on which consensus 
cannot be achieved, but rather that all representative schemes are 
designed only partly with an eye to the resolution of such prob-
lems. In many instances a preference has been shown for leaving 
them unsolved until more. than a majority can be obtained in 
support of a particular solution. Sometimes, indeed, we have 
taken them out of the democratic process altogether. 
The design of representation schemes obviously reflects a com-
promise between notions of majority rule on the one hand, and 
representation of a variety of points of view on the other, and 
where the geographical districts which serve as the basis for in-
terest representation were designed as a secondary device, never 
intended to represent mere acreage or mere population, it should 
be obvious that their rationality cannot be measured either in 
hides or in heads. To state that there is a difference in popu-
lation in geographical districts is to say no more than that popu-
lation was not the only consideration employed in their design. 
Skins are politically neutral, and presumably if the state were 
divided into districts as nearly square as possible, and each con-
taining exactly the same number of inhabitants, there would be 
some sampling of opinion statewide. But what would result would 
be a weighting of the scales which would depend upon concen-
tration or dispersion of persons with like interests. Concentration 
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is to the advantage of small minority groups, for the concentrated 
interest is apt to be guaranteed some representation. Dispersion of 
interests, however, carries with it a better chance of control. Thus, 
in a hypothetical State with 110 inhabitants divided into ten dis-
tricts each with eleven inhabitants, each interest group which can 
muster six votes in the same district will have a representative, 
while a group which can deliver a total of fifty, but no more 
than five in any district, will go without. Theoretically, a group 
with seventy-four votes could fail to control the assembly, though 
sixty votes properly spread could elect one hundred percent of 
the membership. 
Life is not lived in squares and circles, and where legislatures 
have identified groups geographically concentrated in areas of ir-
regular design, they have not hesitated to depart from geometric 
symmetry to define districts which have some political cohesion. 
In doing so, they show their hand, and where the group geograph-
ically delineated is one afforded particular constitutional protec-
tion, as in Gomillion, the Court will no doubt go behind the geom-
etry. The whole pattern is complicated by the existence of general 
function units of government. States are divided into counties, 
townships, cities, and towns. Sometimes the cities are part of the 
surrounding counties, sometimes not. Not only is it an adminis-
trative convenience to use these pre-existing units as represen-
tation districts, but to a limited extent they represent interest 
groups in and of themselves, for the fact that a voter must solve 
many problems as a resident of a given unit gives him a certain 
amount in common with his fellow electors in the unit. For these 
reasons it is common to allocate representation with reference to 
county lines. This presents a complication of very real propor-
tions. Counties vary widely in population, size, and shape, as well 
as in degree of political cohesion. Where a single county does not 
contain a sufficient number of inhabitants to justify individual 
representation, it is coupled with another, and the simple problem 
of fractions may introduce numerical inequalities as great as one 
hundred percent. Also, the coupling of a small county with a 
large one may leave the voters in the small county with little or 
no effective influence in an election held within the joint district. 
Examples of these problems can be seen in both the Tennessee 
and Michigan patterns. In Tennessee, Moore County is the sec-
ond smallest county in the state in terms of population, and also 
the second smallest in area. It is surrounded by four counties, 
each of which has a population which is more than two-thirds of 
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the portion, entitling it, under the state constitution, to have a 
separate representative. In some other areas, overlapping districts 
have been created, and that could have been done in the case of 
Moore. For instance, Moore could have been coupled with one 
of the others in a so-called floterial district. But all the other four 
are already over-represented because of the two-thirds fraction 
rule dictated by the constitution of Tennessee. The smallest of 
the four, Coffee County, has a voter population of 13,406. Moore 
County has a voter population of 2,340. If there is any significant 
difference between the interests of residents of Moore and Coffee 
counties, that of the Moore residents would always be subordinated 
to that of the Coffee residents. Thus the effect of coupling Moore 
County with Coffee is in practical terms to permit Coffee County, 
with only roughly two-thirds of the portion, to elect two repre-
sentatives, while leaving the residents of Moore County with no 
effective power to select any. Since we have seen that the political 
alignment of interests does not necessarily follow along county 
lines, the reverse may be true. If political views are in delicate 
balance in the four surrounding counties, and monolithic in 
Moore, appending Moore to any other county might have the 
result of changing these balances completely. 
In Michigan, the smallest of the senate districts is the thirty-
second. It consists of Baraga, Houghton, Keweenaw, and Onton-
agon counties which are located at the western end of Michigan's 
Upper Peninsula on Lake Superior. The Upper Peninsula in-
cludes 29 percent of Michigan's land mass. It is separated from 
the Lower Peninsula by five miles of water, recently spanned by 
the Mackinac Bridge. The population of the Upper Peninsula, 
according to the 1960 census, is 302,648. If the exact portion were 
applied to the Upper Peninsula as a unit, it would be entitled to 
one and two-thirds senators, or if a major fraction formula is 
applied, to two. Under the provisions of the 1952 amendment, it 
is given three. In view of the fact that it is a large and sparsely-
populated area separated from the balance of the state by water, 
and remote from the more heavily-populated portions of the state, 
can it be said that it is palpably unreasonable to .provide it with 
representation no more disproportionate than that? If it is con-
ceded that it would not be arbitrary to assign three senators to the 
Upper Peninsula, what of the distribution of the three senate 
seats in this area? What has been done is to split off the Kewee-
naw Peninsula area (with a population of 61,008, and including 
the four counties mentioned above) as one district; roughly the 
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western half of the remainder of the Upper Peninsula, containing 
117,233 inhabitants and four counties, as the second (the thirty-
first senatorial district); and the eastern half with a population of 
124,407, and seven counties, as the third (the thirtieth senatorial 
district). Since the thirty-second district is surrounded on three 
sides by water and extends sixty-five miles into Lake Superior, one 
could guess at all manner of special interests which might be 
shared by the inhabitants of this area, and which would not be 
represented in the state senate at all were the area to be coupled 
with enough of the southern or eastern counties in the Upper 
Peninsula to make the district contain a full portion of population. 
The situation is made worse by the physical location of the coun-
ties in the thirty-second, for it cannot be joined with any group 
of counties not contiguous to it. 
Of course it is true that leaving apportionment to a legislative 
assembly which represents at any given time a particular align-
ment of political interests is, in a sense, if one may paraphrase 
Bentham's remark about the elevation of practicing attorneys to 
the bench, to make a procuress mistress of a girls' school. As we 
have seen, without regard to equal numbers within a district a 
minority of thirty-six can control a majority of seventy-four, where 
a 110-person universe is divided into ten districts and enough in-
genuity is employed in drawing the district lines. This means 
that a majority may perpetuate its control until it drops below 
the number required to control fifty-one percent of the votes in 
fifty-one percent of the districts. With unequal districts, theo-
retically even this floor disappears. Unless it appears that this 
nadir has been reached, however, or that the Constitution requires 
formal equality, there seems to be no difference between effective 
disfranchisement of interest groups through ingenuity in drawing 
the district lines on the one hand, and differences in the number 
of persons residing in the various districts on the other. 
Since it has been suggested in none of the apportionment cases 
that disfranchisement has proceeded this far, we are left with the 
existence of the requirement of numerical, or formal, equality. 
In a number of places it has been shown that there is no historical 
justification for the statement that the Constitution required such 
equality, either at the time of its adoption, or after the adoption 
of the fourteenth amendment. This does not mean that the con-
cept of equal protection might not grow to include such a require-
ment, for, as the Court said in the Brown case, it came to the con-
clusion that education had changed in importance, and that even 
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though it might be conceded that earlier Courts would not require 
unsegregated schools, that did not foreclose this one from reading 
the effects of segregation in the light of what we know about it 
today. 
In the area of representation, can any practical argument of 
change of circumstances be marshalled to justify the requirement 
of formal equality in representation districts? A good case can 
be made for the directly opposite proposition. When city popu-
lations were a small minority interest in most state affairs, direct 
intervention in their local affairs was common. In the middle of 
the nineteenth· century state legislatures provided a city hall for 
Philadelphia, in Maryland controlled the purchase of such ordi-
nary city equipment as an individual fire engine, and in New 
York and elsewhere set up special commissions to take over local 
police administration.240 Today virtually every state has adopted 
constitutional limitations on the enactment by state legislatures of 
"local" legislation.241 Many states have protected the urban man-
agement of local affairs through constitutional home rule provi-
sions,242 and, as a general pattern, legislative action with respect 
to cities and towns has steered an unswerving course toward 
greater local power.243 As city populations have grown, they have 
had an ever-increasing impact upon statewide elections, and it 
must be remembered that control of the governor's mansion car-
ries with it control of the executive veto, and the not inconsid-
erable power to control executive discretion and to make an ever-
increasing number of appointments. In addition, cities have 
wielded an enormous power in the selection of national officers. 
It may be presumed, for instance, that since Senators are chosen 
on a statewide basis, an urban majority within the state can control 
their election. 
As urban populations have grown to and beyond half the 
population in some states, the problem has been one of whether 
this particular grouping of interests shall be permitted to control 
the entire state. Its desire to do so, in addition to the usual mo-
tives of power and patronage, may have stemmed to some extent 
from the fact that general function districts have often been out 
of line with living arrangements, and cities have felt that the effi-
cient management of the affairs of large metropolitan areas can 
240 See PATE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ADMINISTRATION 60 (1954). 
241 See INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 939 (2d ed. 1959). 
242 See id. at 714. 
243 Indeed, frequently the powers of cities under legislative charters or optional 
charter laws are greater than under many of the home rule provisions. 
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be accomplished only by such control. Home rule, they feel, is not 
enough, because it does not permit coercion of areas outside the 
governmental unit. Control of the legislature often carries with it 
control of the design of units of local government, and, even where 
it does not, it is often necessary for effective efforts to amend the 
state constitution. 
It should be stated here that the disproportion in representa-
tion between urban and rural areas is not by any means the only 
limit to the absolute exercise of the powers of majorities within 
the states, or within the national government. A requirement of 
more than a majority to propose or adopt at referendum a con-
stitutional amendment, or to incur obligations, is also in the teeth 
of the concept that wherever a group of political interests can 
control fifty-one percent of the votes within the political unit, it 
may force its will upon the minority.244 Home-rule provisions, long 
the objective of urban populations, limitations on the power to 
tax, and a host of other strings tied to the legislature's power to 
rule, are all cut from the same cloth. Nor is disproportionate 
representation a single class, for the bargain can be drawn in a 
number of ways. In the United States government it is in the 
nature of a veto. Geographical minorities are protected by over-
representation in the Senate, while majorities are protected in the 
House of Representatives. This is a pattern followed in several 
of the states, and indeed, the pattern adopted by the people of 
Michigan when they approved the constitutional amendment of 
1952. In Tennessee, geographical apportionment, as amended by 
the passage of years, preserves in the rural areas the power to rule 
absolutely, though even there the statement can be made only 
with respect to these two of the many alignments which no doubt 
exist. Since the senate districts are different from those employed 
in the lower house, different interests may be represented in one 
than in the other. For instance, to the extent that their interests are 
different from those of the city of Knoxville, the residents of Roane 
County are not in a position to elect a representative to the Ten-
nessee senate, for they are placed in a senate district including that 
city, and the Knoxville voting population constitutes nearly sev-
enty percent of the total. In the lower house, on the other hand, 
Roane constitutes a single-county district. 
As between urban and rural areas, the allocation of seats in 
the senate on a basis other than by population, coupled with a 
lower house apportioned on the basis of population alone, is 
244 See, e.g., GRAVES, STATE CON5IlTUTIONAL REVISION 26 (1960). 
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nothing but a compromise made necessary by the fact that the 
unit for democratic action was determined at a time when there 
was a better balance between interest groups and population, and 
the assumption could be made that on most issues the fifty-one 
to forty-nine vote would be acceptable to the minority. As an 
increasingly large proportion of the state's population has become 
concentrated in cities and highly interested in the problems of 
cities, this minimum degree of homogeneity has become doubtful 
and the people have decided that it is better to operate by stale-
mate and bargin as a process for achieving consensus at a higher 
level. 
In summary, though there may be an abstract right to partici-
pate in general elections in whatever political units one finds one's 
self, the very nature of representative government based upon geo-
graphical selection places some voters on one side and some on 
the other. Therefore, there will always be voters whose viewpoint 
or political stamp will not be represented by the person selected 
to represent him in the legislative council. If one views the right 
to representation as a device for achieving expression of the vot-
er's view, and further as a right personal to each voter, the right 
is not one susceptible of full vindication in any system of repre-
sentative government based upon representation of geographical 
areas, and even its approximation is made impossible by a re-
quirement of compactness, contiguity, and districts of equal popu-
lation. Such a system would simply substitute the cast of the dice 
in terms of concentration and dispersion for some more reasonable 
effort to see that a wide variety of points of view achieve repre-
sentation in legislative deliberations. The requirement of equality 
of populations within districts, uncoupled with a requirement of 
compactness and contiguity, would place a floor under the num-
ber of votes required to control the political institutions in a 
given jurisdiction, the floor being half plus one of the number of 
votes in one district times half plus one of the number of repre-
sentative districts. This may be desirable in itself, but the ad-
vantages should be weighed against the drawbacks. There are 
administrative reasons for preferring compactness and contiguity 
of districts where possible, and the coupling of general function 
and representative districts. The requirement of equality of num-
bers may face the legislature or the constitutional convention with 
a choice between the efficient operation of the election process 
and the desire to see to it that important but geographically dis-
persed segments of the population find expression in legislative 
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deliberations over the affairs of the state. It should also be noted 
that there has never been a showing that geographical representa-
tion not precisely equated to population as a practical matter has 
ever resulted in control by so small a minority. Its interdiction, 
then, may result in positive disadvantages without any concomitant 
practical advantage. 
B. The Function of the Federal Courts 
It is obviously within the power and the duty of the Supreme 
Court to determine whether or not the equal protection clause 
requires equality of population within representation districts. 
History indicates that it does not.245 Present practice indicates that 
it does not. The precedents of the Court indicate that it does not.246 
Finally, four of the eight Justices sitting in Baker v. Carr have 
stated that it does not.247 
But this is not to say that no problem remains under the equal 
protection clause. By way of analogy, Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
stated in his Gomillion opinion that the equal protection clause 
does not afford protection against mere inequalities in tax bur-
den.248 He would not gainsay, however, that the Court will exam-
ine a tax statute where it is alleged that invidious discrimination 
among taxpayers similarly situated underlies the tax.249 He simply 
stated the rule that where there is no requirement of precise equal-
ity, an allegation of the lack of it makes no case under the four-
teenth amendment. He suggested, for example, that were the state 
to arrange its representation system so as to discriminate against 
Negroes, or Jews, or red-headed people, the equal protection clause 
would come into play.250 
Mr. Justice Douglas suggested that a showing that the differ-
ences in representation ratio between areas are very great is in 
itself enough to require that the plaintiff be afforded an oppor-
tunity to prove "invidious discrimination." This view also has 
245 See, e.g., the historical material in the Frankfurter dissent in Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. at 302-24. See also the opinion of Edwards, J., in Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. at 85, 
104 N.W.2d at 107. 
240 E.g., MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948). 
247 Justices Clark, Harlan, Frankfurter, and Stewart. The views of Mr. Justice 
Brennan and the Chief Justice are unknown. Presumably Justices Black and Douglas 
believe that the Constitution requires substantial equality of representation, though 
even Mr. Justice Douglas states that there is room for weighting. See text supra at 748. 
248 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343 (1960). 
240 E.g., l\!r. Justice Frankfurter joined the majority in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949), and in Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 
620 (1946). 
2fi0 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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analogies in the cases decided under the equal protection and 
commerce clauses. Thus differences in tax treatment of outsiders 
which are small enough plausibly to be taken as efforts at equal-
ization of burden or necessary to assure collection may pass mus-
ter, while large inequalities may show by their very size that they 
are intended to place the outsider at a competitive disadvantage.201 
But these cases can be said to rest upon the fact that the insider-
outsider classification is a prohibited one, and the degree of the 
difference is an element in proof that the prohibited classification 
is the one which was employed. The equal protection cases dealing 
with distribution of tax burdens within the state indicate that a 
necessary element of the plaintiff's case is a showing not only that 
he is treated differently from other taxpayers, but that he is treated 
differently from those similarly situated. If the Court is convinced 
that property is of a different kind or character, for instance, dif-
ferences in tax rate will not be corrected.252 Similarly, where a ta.x 
is levied upon one business or activity, the Court will not insist 
that it be levied on another.253 In these cases the degree of differ-
ence is not important. If the state may classify property into real 
and personal, tangible, railroad property, machinery and tools, 
etc., and may apply different rates to each, then it may make these 
differences in rate small or large, as it sees fit, or indeed may tax 
some and leave others untaxed. If a state may classify two busi-
nesses into different classes, then it may levy high taxes on one 
and none at all on another.254 These cases are different from those 
involving the determination of proper classes because the general 
distribution of tax burden is thought to be one largely of legisla-
tive discretion. The allocation of benefits also comes under this 
heading. Before a citizen can persuade a court to interfere with 
the state's decision to pay benefits to some, or provide services to 
others, it must be shown that the class is improper. If the class is 
a permissible one, the amount of the benefit, or the degree of di£-
251 See, e.g., Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 516 (1926). 
252 See, e.g., Charleston Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 191 (1945). 
See also Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 159 (1930). 
253 See, e.g., the statement of the Court in Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 
526-27 (1959): "The State may impose different specific tax.es upon different trades and 
professions and may vary the rate of excise upon various products • . . ," and see the 
cases cited therein. See also Sholley, Equal Protection in Tax Legislation, 24 VA. L. REv. 
229 (1938). 
254 In Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87 (1935), the amount of the tax was $240,000. 
In Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937), the tax on a local mer-
chant operating ten grocery stores was $10 each, while the tax on a national chain with 
600, operating only one in Louisiana, was $550 for that one. See Sholley, supra note 253, 
at 255. 
1963] LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT 775 
ference between services provided, is within the discretion of the 
state. 
Generally, geographical differences have fallen into this second 
category of cases, for the reason that the differences between pop-
ulations situated in different areas are so many that it is impossible 
to say that there exists no reasonable basis for the classification. 
Occasionally, as in the case of racial discrimination, or in the 
definition of special assessment districts, it is possible to see 
through the geography to identify an impermissible classifi.ca-
tion.255 In the annexation cases, on the other hand, the burdens 
and benefits of living within the city limits are so hard to identify 
and quantify that the Court has been reluctant to attempt the 
task of weighing them.256 
This is not to say that geography per se is a proper basis of 
classification. Where the Court is able to identify geographical 
areas identical in every respect germane to the purposes for which 
the classification was made, it sometimes has inquired into the 
legality of differences in treatment. If the city zones one area dif-
ferently from another without any supporting differences in situa-
tion, it runs the risk of unconstitutionality.257 Hypothetically, if 
it were to split a single tract of identical residences into two zones 
and apply one tax rate to one and a higher to another, can there 
be any doubt that the Court would apply the usual standards of 
tax equality?258 
Applying Mr. Justice Douglas's reasoning in his Baker opinion, 
there is no rationality in treating one voter differently just be-
cause he lives in one place or another. Where the differences in 
representation are small, it may be assumed that some other good 
255 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See also Myles Salt Co. v. 
Board of Comm'rs, 239 U.S. 478 (1916). 
256 See, e.g., Texas ex rel. Pan Am. Prod. Co. v. City of Texas City, 355 U.S. 603 
(1958). See also Comment, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 279, 315-17 (1959). 
257 See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), reversing 260 Mass. 
441, 157 N.E. 618 (1927). In the zoning cases the issue is generally framed as one of 
the reasonableness of a land-use limitation, rather than as one of equality of treatment. 
In cases in which the forbidden use is permitted to property owners whose premises 
are cheek and jowl with the restricted parcel, however, it could be framed as a denial 
of equal protection rather than due process. See De Lano v. City of Tulsa, 26 F.2d 640, 
645 (8th Cir. 1928). There the rejection of the equal protection argument as applied 
to the facts of the case illustrates the difficulties of controlling the exercise of powers 
involving broad discretion. "Equality of protection of the law in such cases requires 
consideration of the relative conditioxs as applied to the particular property and other 
properties and locations within the scope of the ordinance." Id. at 645-46. 
258 Cf. People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Allyn, 393 Ill. 154, 65 N.E.2d 392 (1946), brought 
under the Illinois constitutional requirement that property taxes be levied ad valorem. 
In the Schlaeger case the inequality of the effective rate was brought about by differ-
ences in ratio of true to assessed value in two different counties, and the court relied 
upon the factual nature of the assessment process to justify its refusal to intervene. 
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and sufficient reason may support them. Where they are gross-
and Mr. Justice Clark would add, where they appear random-
there arises a presumption that they are not justified by any dif-
ference in situation germane to the purpose of the classification. 
Certainly it might be conceded that were his horribles to take place, 
for example, were the city of Memphis to be split into two wards, 
one with a population of 10,000 and the other with a population of 
386,000, and the first were given ten seats on the municipal council 
and the second, one, the difference would be hard to rationalize on 
the basis of any legitimate objective of representative government. 
But this is to say only that there comes a point beyond which 
differences of degree become differences of kind. By way of analogy 
to the tax and regulation cases, either a tax or a regulation can be 
so onerous to a given calling or property owner so as to be treated 
as a prohibition or confiscation. When this point is reached, the 
Court will inquire into the power to prohibit or the power to 
seize.259 In like fashion, a difference in representation might at some 
point be looked upon as a disfranchisement in disguise. In such 
a case, surely the Court would shift the inquiry from one governed 
by permissible standards of distribution to one governed by stand-
ards of exclusion.260 
Difficulties of relief remain, regardless of the substantive stand-
ard employed. Of course the federal courts should avoid affront 
to the processes of the state wherever it is possible to do so. And 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter is no doubt correct in asserting that courts 
are sometimes faced with situations which make any available 
mode of relief worse than the evil they are designed to correct. 
This is not always true, however. In the Gomillion case, for ex-
ample, the declaration of invalidity of the Alabama statute had 
the result simply of effecting a return to old district lines. As the 
Illinois history suggests, this may be worse than nothing in the 
case of long failure to redistrict. It is not true that all such cases 
259 Where there is the power to prohibit, of course, the fact that taxation is em-
ployed as the method of effecting the prohibition will not invalidate the exercise of the 
power. See, e.g., Rast v. Van Deman &: Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342 (1916). There the Court 
was not convinced that the tax in question was prohibitory, but went on to say that, 
assuming that it was, the business taxed (coupons redeemable in merchandise) could 
be prohibited consistent with the due process clause. 
260 Complete exclusion from representation on the basis of geography has been 
rare, but there have been such cases. See People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463 (1867). See 
also 2 COOLEY, CONSTlTUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 1394 (8th ed. 1927). In the Maynard case, 
the legislature had created a new county by splitting off from another county one whole 
township and parts of two others. The court said the effect of this would be to permit 
the whole township to elect the entire governing board, depriving the residents of the 
scraps of their votes in county elections. It held that this would be in violation of the 
state constitution. 
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present the same difficulties. In the congressional reapportionment 
cases, federal statutes cover the case by providing for elections at 
large. In the Georgia county unit system cases, the primary laws 
could be saved without the offending method of counting the 
votes. Equitable relief is discretionary to a large extent, and the 
Court can control any absence of good sense which district courts 
from time to time might display. It goes without saying that Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter was correct in suggesting that the federal 
courts should refrain from simply shouting down a rain barrel 
and should limit their activities to the correction of evils amen-
able to judicial methods. This they will do if they follow the 
general principles of equal protection litigation. It remains to 
be seen whether the district courts will adhere to these general 
guides or will read Baker v. Carr as a license to supervise legisla-
tive apportionment to the end of achieving a system consonant 
with their own notions of a proper polity. So far, evidence is 
limited and conflicting. 
V. PosT-BAKER DEVELOPMENTS 
A. The Baker Case on Remand 
In appraising the reaction of the federal district and state courts 
to these cases in the light of the Baker,261 Scholle,262 and Simon263 
opinions, it is useful first to follow those three cases on remand. 
The subsequent history of Baker v. Carr vindicates Mr. Justice 
Clark's view on the necessity of remand for trial. At a pre-trial 
conference the Attorney General of the state appeared and stated 
that he was authorized to advise the court that the Governor 
of Tennessee would issue a call for a special session of the legisla-
ture to consider the question of reapportionment in view of the 
holding of the Supreme Court. He then moved for a stay of pro-
ceedings until the General Assembly could be convened and could 
act upon the matter.264 The court reserved its ruling on the mo-
tion, and June 11, 1962, was set as the date for further hearing. 
By June 7, the General Assembly had enacted legislation reappor-
tioning the membership of both the senate and lower house, and 
this legislation had been signed by the governor. 
The district court began its consideration of the new T ennes-
see apportionment acts by patching together a standard from snip-
201 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
262 Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S. 429 (1962). 
263 W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190 (1962). 
204 See Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). 
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pets from the various opinions in the Baker case. It noticed that 
Mr. Justice Clark felt that the original Tennessee scheme was 
wholly irrational and arbitrary, and linked Mr. Justice Stewart to 
this view because of language in his opinion describing the com-
plaint, despite the fact that Mr. Justice Stewart refused to call the 
scheme arbitrary and carefully limited his decision to the justici-
ability of apportionment questions. It quoted from Mr. Justice 
Douglas to the effect that the equal protection clause prohibits in-
vidious discriminations, and stated that "there can be no doubt 
that the majority of the Supreme Court ruled in this case, as stated 
by Mr. Justice Clark, at least sub silentio, that invidious discrimina-
tions were present in the 1901 reapportionment statute and that 
it fell far short of the standards of the equal protection clause."265 
It also quoted from the Brennan opinion this further characteriza-
tion of the complaint, "the injury which appellants assert is that 
this classification disfavors the voters in the counties in which they 
reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable 
inequality vis-a-vis voters in irrationally favored counties,"260 added 
Mr. Justice Douglas's reference to "egregious injustices,"267 mixed 
them all together, and came up with this question: "Do the stat-
utes establish classifications predicated upon a rational basis, or are 
they utterly arbitrary and lacking in rationality?"268 This is, of 
course, the Clark test. 
It then became necessary to inquire into whether the new ap-
portionment acts fell within the stated test. The court conceded 
that in overall plan the apportionment of the lower house had 
eliminated or mollified some of the most glaring inequities-with-
out reference to what these were-and that it could be explained 
in some of its major features upon a basis which the court was not 
prepared to say was within itself irrational, but added that "it 
nevertheless possesses some inequities and inequalities which in 
our opinion should be corrected or removed in order to avoid 
grave doubts as to its constitutionality."269 It thereupon picked 
out a number of instances of treatment it considered unequal, 
much in the fashion of Mr. Justice Clark's illustrations of lack of 
pattern. With the exception of two of these instances, they all 
relate to the fractional representation of counties in so-called 
floterial districts. Thus the court suggested that it is unfair to 
265 Id. at 345. 
266 Id. at 344. 
267 See 369 U.S. at 250 n.5 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
268 Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 345 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). 
269 Id. at 345. 
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provide Anderson County (33,554) with a single representative 
while Rutherford (30,347) has an individual representative and 
also participates with Cannon (5,235) and Dekalb (6,660) in a 
floterial district.270 The other two instances of doubt were the 
over-representation of Sevier and Fayette counties. According to 
voter population they were both under the two-thirds fraction but 
were both given individual representation.271 The defendants ar-
gued that these two counties were given full representation be-
cause their total population would have entitled them to full 
representation, had the distribution been on this basis. It was said 
that these were the only two counties in which this would be true. 
The court rejected this explanation with the statement that these 
were the only two instances in which total population rather than 
voter population was taken as the basis of representation.272 Em-
ployment of a standard of one full representative to each county 
which has two-thirds of the portion based upon either total popu-
lation or voter population seemingly was the one employed. The 
court did not explain why this is not an acceptable standard under 
the equal protection clause. It seems to say that it is impermissible 
in that it applies one standard to one group, and another standard 
to another. This is of course arrant nonsense, for, if both total 
population and voter population are permissible standards under 
the equal protection clause, there appears no reason whatever for 
supposing that they cannot be used in the alternative in providing 
minimum representation. 
With regard to the apportionment of the Senate, the court 
perceived Mr. Justice Clark's "crazy quilt."273 The overall varia-
tion in ratio was about two and one-half to one. As between rural 
areas, the court saw a bias in favor of the eastern counties. As be-
tween urban districts, there was a difference in representation ratio 
as great as thirty-seven percent between Sullivan County (Bristol) 
and the si.xth senate district-Knox and Anderson Counties (Knox-
ville and suburbs). The court concluded that the act apportioning 
the senate was "utterly arbitrary and lacking in rationality. Its 
only consistent pattern is one of invidious discrimination."274 
There was no discussion at all of rural bias as such. No figures 
were given as to differences in ratio as between major centers of 
population and more sparsely-populated areas. As far as the ration-
210 Id. at 346. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid. 
273 Id. at 346-47. 
274 Id. at 348. 
780 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
ale of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the acts goes, then, 
it is based upon Mr. Justice Clark's formula. The equal protection 
clause requires rational pattern and differences must not be willy-
nilly and unexplained. 
The court did not stop here, however. It proceeded to pro-
vide guidelines for the enactment of a statute which will in its 
opinion provide a constitutionally valid apportionment plan. The 
minimum standards of equality proposed by the court were these: 
the two-thirds rule of the Tennessee constitution can be applied to 
the apportionment of the house of representatives; if so, however, 
the apportionment of the senate must be on a true basis of popu-
lation without regard to fractions; on the other hand, if there is 
an apportionment of the senate on a rational basis other than 
strict adherence to population, the house of representatives must 
be apportioned on a true population basis without regard to the 
two-thirds fraction rule.275 
This is not quite the standard required by the constitution 
of Tennessee, but almost. The Tennessee constitution requires 
that counties having two-thirds of the portion must be given 
separate representation in the house of representatives, and further 
that, in apportioning senate seats, insofar as possible the fractions 
lost by the application of the two-thirds rule be made up to the 
counties with voter population above the portion.276 
This standard leaves at large the question of what rational 
pattern could be employed in apportioning the senate. If one 
takes the court's reaction to the 1962 act apportioning the house 
of representatives, relatively small differences in treatment may be 
deemed unfair and unconstitutional. This is not to say, however, 
that were differences consistent with some overall formula, the 
court would consider that the same order of difference would con-
stitute irrationality. Thus a system which was based upon a for-
mula designed to reflect population density might be all right. To 
Mr. Justice Clark's requirement of rationality, then, the district 
court has added the requirement of strict population apportion-
ment in at least one house of the legislature. Both must be rational 
and one must be by the poll.277 
The problem of relief in Baker v. Carr, as in all such cases, was 
a puzzling one. It will be remembered that the Tennessee Supreme 
Court had held that, were it to declare the 1901 act unconstitu-
tional, there would be no legal legislature to perform the function 
275 Id. at 349. 
276 Ibid. 
an Ibid. 
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of passing a valid apportionment statute, and the state would be 
in chaos. Mr. Justice Douglas had tossed this problem off with the 
observation that the contrary opinion had been expressed by the 
Supreme Court of Iowa, an opinion which he said is "plainly 
correct."278 The district court was somewhat more cautious. It 
read the decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Kidd v. 
McCanless270 as holding that only where there has been a judicial 
determination of the illegality of a statute under which an officer 
holds his office such an officer cannot be a de facto officer. After 
expressing some doubt as to whether this is binding upon the 
federal courts enforcing constitutional rights, it proceeded to 
"find and hold" that the doctrine had no application to the ex-
pression of views of unconstitutionality by the court, where the 
court expressly withholds final judgment, including the "declara-
tion of invalidity." This, the court continued, will permit legal 
elections to be held under the I 962 statutes, and the legislature 
"to act with the express sanction of the Court to effect the neces-
sary remedial measures and consequently in 'good faith' as far as 
its authority is concerned."280 
This disposition of the case leaves all the issues at large until 
June 3, 1963, when the Tennessee Legislature will either enact 
an apportionment statute satisfactory to the district court, or not. 
The court spoke of its method of handling the situation as avoid-
ing "a far more drastic form of relief," without specifying what 
that form might be. And so we leave the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee and the governor and 
General Assembly of that no longer so sovereign state to their game 
of "ducks and drakes," and proceed to Michigan. 
B. The Scholle Case on Remand 
In the Scholle case, it will be remembered that the Michigan 
Supreme Court had decided in favor of the 1952 amendment by 
a margin of four to three,281 with the majority enjoying the vote 
of a fifth member of the eight-man court who was of the opinion 
that it was beyond the power of the Michigan court to correct the 
abuse.282 The case was remanded for reconsideration in light of 
what had been said in Baker v. Carr. It could be expected that 
278 Baker v. Carr, 367 U.S. at 250 n.5. See Cedar Rapids v. Cox, 252 Iowa 948, 108 
N.W.2d 253 (1961), 
270 Kidd v. l\fcCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956). 
280 Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 350 (l\f.D. Tenn. 1962). 
281 See te.xt supra at 758. 
282 Black, J. 
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Justice Black of the Michigan court would reverse his position and 
vote for a declaration that the amendment was unconstitutional. 
This he did. Since Justices Carr, Kelly and Dethmers had not 
seen a violation of the equal protection clause in the case when first 
heard, their view on remand might be expected to depend upon 
whether they took Mr. Justice Stewart at his word about the ex-
tent of the majority holding in Baker v. Carr, or, like the federal 
district court in Tennessee, followed Mr. Justice Clark's suggestion 
that the message of the majority went to the merits as well. Clearly 
they read the holding in the Stewart form, but added that even 
if one supposes Baker to rule on the merits of the constitutional 
claim in Tennessee, the fact that the differences in representation 
ratio existed in both houses there distinguishes the Michigan case. 
In short, Justices Carr, Kelly, and Dethmers, stuck to their guns. 
By the time the Scholle case was reheard, Justice Edwards had left 
the court. If, as Mr. Justice Harlan suggested, the Edwards opin-
ion had been grounded flatly on the merits, this change in court 
personnel had the effect of destroying the majority of four. In 
this connection it is worthy of notice that Edwards' place was 
taken by Justice Adams, the former attorney general of the state 
who had argued the case before the original Scholle court. Because 
of this connection, Justice Adams disqualified himself. Though 
of course one cannot be certain that an advocate's views will fol-
low him onto the bench,283 the decision of the court after the sec-
ond Scholle hearing, resting as it does on a majority not large 
enough to grant relief where the full court is sitting, does not say 
the last word on the standards to be applied in measuring the 
rationality of senate apportionment.284 If the Michigan constitu-
tion were subsequently amended to provide a senate plan in all 
respects similar, it is by no means certain that the court would 
strike it down.285 
283 See, e.g., The License Cases (Thurlow v. Massachusetts), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 
575 (1847), where Mr. Chief Justice Taney eats the arguments he had made in Brown v. 
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). But Mr. Chief Justice Taney had twenty 
years in which to convince himself that he was wrong. 
284 In the November 1962 election, Justice Adams was replaced by Justice O'Hara, 
leaving the Michigan court split evenly between Democrats and Republicans. 
285 Under the proposed new constitution of Michigan, to be submitted to the voters 
on April 1, 1963, and if approved, to take effect on January 1, 1964, the lower house 
would be apportioned among ll0 single-member representative districts substantially 
according to population. Counties containing seven-tenths of one percent of the state's 
population would be entitled to separate representation. The senate would be appor-
tioned among thirty-eight single-member districts on the basis of apportionment factors. 
The apportionment factors of each county would be determined by taking the sum of 
its percentage of the state's population multiplied by four, and its percentage of the 
state's land area. Reliance upon legislative apportionment would be abandoned in favor 
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In granting relief the Michigan Supreme Court was not so 
cautious as was the district court in Tennessee. The new attorney 
general, reversing the position taken by his predecessor, had 
dropped the argument on the merits, and had asked that the whole 
matter be postponed until the state legislature could enact a new 
senate apportionment. The majority of the court did not follow 
this suggestion. It declared the 1952 amendment unconstitutional 
and enjoined the holding of the August 1962 primaries under its 
provisions. 286 
The second Scholle decision by the Michigan court was handed 
down on July 18, 1962. The primary elections were scheduled for 
August 20. Application for stay of the state court's order was made 
to Mr. Justice Stewart, to permit application for certiorari to re-
view the decision, and the stay was granted. Certiorari has been 
applied for,287 so the Michigan apportionment scheme, and the 
general question of geographical representation in one house bal-
anced by popular representation in the other, will be back before 
the Court this term, assuming, of course, that the question is not 
ducked by a denial of the certiorari petition. 
C. The Simon Case on Remand 
W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon288 was reheard by the same three-
judge court which decided it initially. This time Judge Waterman 
joined in the decision that the New York constitutional provision 
and the apportionment enacted under it on the merits do not 
violate the equal protection clause. From Baker v. Carr and the 
various cases decided by the district courts since the Baker case, 
Judge Levet formulated five tests: (1) rationality, (2) presence of 
a historical basis, (3) existence of possible remedies if gross in-
equality exists, (4) geography, including accessibility of repre-
sentatives to their electors, and (5) whether the court is called 
upon to invalidate solemnly enacted state constitutions and laws.289 
Applying these tests to the facts in New York, Judge Levet saw 
nothing irrational about the New York formula, providing, as it 
of decennial apportionment by an eight-member bipartisan commission, with provision 
for an additional two members in the event that a third party polls 25% of the guber-
natorial vote at the last general election at which a governor was elected preceding 
each apportionment. 
286 Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, ll6 N.W.2d 350 (1962). 
287 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 517). 
288 208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), appeal docketed, 31 U.SL. WEEK 3132 (U.S. 
Sept. 26, 1962) (No. 460). 
280 Id, at 374. 
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does, minimum representation to each county. He found that there 
is sound historical reason for choosing the county as the unit of 
representation. As an available remedy he pointed out that the 
New York constitution provides for a referendum every twenty 
years on the question of calling a constitutional convention, and 
further that in 1957 such a vote was taken after announcement by 
Governor Harriman that the most urgent constitutional reform 
needed was "to elect one house of the legislature on the basis of 
population to give big cities fuller representation." Although the 
ten most populous counties contain 73.5 percent of the citizen 
population of the state, the vote was against the call. Were the 
call to issue, three delegates would be chosen from each senate 
district, and fifteen from the state at large. This means, says Judge 
Levet, that at a constitutional convention the ten most populous 
counties might well control. 
As to geography, the court thought that the very large size of 
some of the up-state New York counties, contrasted with the small 
size and high concentration of population in the counties in New 
York City, created problems militating against apportionment 
on a strict population basis. The choices become whether one in-
creases the total number of assemblymen-already 150-to the 
point of making discussion less productive, or creates districts so 
large that the representative loses touch with his constituents.200 
Finally, Judge Levet reiterated the presumptions against the 
invalidity of state laws and constitutions, suggesting that it must 
be a plain case in which a federal court will act to invalidate such 
prov1s1ons. 
Judge Ryan wrote a brief separate opinion concurring in the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law stated by Judge Levet, and 
concluding that the court has jurisdiction, that this jurisdiction 
has been exercised, "and, after trial and examination of the stat-
utes involved ... the complaint herein should be dismissed upon 
its merits."291 Judge Waterman also concurred in Judge Levet's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and with his colleagues in 
dismissing the complaint on the merits.292 
This leaves W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon ready for the Supreme 
Court. At least everyone has agreed that it was disposed of on 
the merits-every judge on the three-judge court felt the necessity 
to state this fact explicitly. Appeal lies directly to the Supreme 
290 Id. at 379. 
291 Id. at 385. 
202 Ibid. 
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Court. The case has not been frozen in the lower court like Baker 
v. Carr. It seems probable, therefore, that before final settlement 
of the latter, the Simon case will reach the Supreme Court. If the 
district court is upheld in its determination that there is no un-
constitutional discrimination in New York, the minimum repre-
sentation formula may rapidly become the universal pattern. It 
should be noted that, while there is a large top-to-bottom variation 
in ratio in New York, the urban voters have a majority of seats 
in both houses, and the rural bias is not very great. New York 
City, for instance, has a population which constitutes 46.0 per-
cent of the population of the state; it elects 43.3 percent of the 
total number of assemblymen, and 43.l percent of the total num-
ber of senators. The ten most populous counties in the state, with 
73.5 percent of the citizen population, elect 65.5 percent of the 
senators, and 62.0 percent of the assemblymen. The complaint is 
not in the nature of a challenge to rural domination, but an urban 
attempt to increase a majority on the theory that direct proportion 
to population is required. How far differences could be stretched 
by minimum representation and fall within the reach of the Simon 
decision is doubtful. In Tennessee, for instance, where there are 
ninety-five counties, and the constitution places a limit of ninety-
nine on the number of representatives, the application of a mini-
mum representation of one representative per county would leave 
only four to be distributed on a population basis. In New York, on 
the other hand, there are only sixty-two counties and there are 150 
assemblymen, leaving eighty-eight to be distributed among the 
more heavily populated counties. 
The Simon court was much less concerned about individual 
differences than was the district court in Tennessee on the Baker 
remand. While the latter found that a difference of four to one 
in the population of single districts demonstrated invidious geo-
graphical discrimination,293 the New York federal district court 
passed off a two-to-one difference in the number of persons residing 
in the largest and smallest senate district with the following re-
mark: "No proof was submitted by plaintiffs that the senatorial 
districts, aside from some variance in citizen population were other-
wise subject to criticism. The system is not irrational. It clearly 
gives weight to population within the state's counties which forms 
a basis for the ingredient of area, accessibility and character of 
interest,"294 and held rational and valid a lower house apportion-
203 Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). 
!!04 W.M.C.A:-;-Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
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ment in which the difference in population between the largest 
and smallest district was fourteen to one. 
VI. OTHER REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICT COURT CASES: 
INTO THE THICKET WITH ABACUS AND PRUNING HooK 
A. Trilogy in Georgia 
First of the post-Baker filings was Sanders v. Gray.205 Like Cook 
v. Fortson (Turman v. Duckworth),296 South v. Peters,297 Cox v. 
Peters,298 and Hartsfield v. Sloan,299 it was brought to challenge the 
validity of the Georgia county unit system. The case was filed, it 
is said, within half an hour after the decision in Baker v. Carr was 
announced. It was heard by a three-judge court consisting of 
Judges Bell, Hooper, and Tuttle. 
The treatment of the Georgia county unit cases by the Baker 
Court has already been discussed. The Brennan opinion refers to 
these cases as involving a refusal to use equity's powers. The 
Douglas opinion leaves them all to Brennan. The Clark opinion 
treats them as having demonstrated the policy of abstaining from 
interference where the system is rational. The Stewart opinion 
does not mention them at all. And the Frankfurter and Harlan 
opinions treat the cases as still good law. At the very outside, then, 
it cannot be said that Baker can stand as a precedent rejecting 
South v. Peters as applied to its precise facts. 
While the Sanders case was in gremio legis, the Georgia legis-
lature acted to ameliorate to a considerable extent the rural bias 
built into the county unit system. The original six-four-two for-
mula was abandoned and Fulton County was given forty unit 
votes, Dekalb, twenty, Chatham, sixteen, down to two apiece for 
the smallest ninety-seven counties. 
The court stated that it took the decision in Baker v. Carr 
as adopting the test stated in Mr. Justice Douglas's dissenting 
opinion in South v. Peters, that "where nominations are made in 
primary elections, there shall be no inequality in voting power by 
reason of race, creed, color, or other invidious discrimination."300 
This prompted test number two. "Having applied the equal pro-
205 203 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ga. 1962) [for later history, see note 300 infra]. 
296 329 U.S. 675 (1946). 
297 339 U.S. 276 (1950). 
20s 342 U.S. 936 (1952). 
299 357 U.S. 916 (1958). 
soo See Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 168 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated and Temanded, 
31 U.S.L. WEEK 4285 (U.S. March 18, 1963), with the Supreme Court holding that the 
equal protection clause required application of the "one person, one vote" principle to 
statewide voting, but expressly indicating that its decision did not at all relate to state 
legislative apportionment questions. 
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tection clause ... we apply the test of invidious discrimination."301 
The unit system, it said, is not illegal qua unit system, but it must 
not run "afoul of constitutional inhibitions." Step three is the for-
mulation of a test for "invidiousness." The right of an individual, 
said the court, must be related to the treatment of his county as 
against the state as a whole, and he cannot complain of over-in-
fluence of some other county, but only under-influence of his 
own.302 This was said to be so because the state has a power to 
"diffuse" political initiative, a power upheld in MacDougall v. 
Green. 303 Another factor to be considered, said the court, is 
whether there is a historical basis for the unit system. It went on 
to find such a basis. A third consideration was said to be whether 
or not there is a political remedy. It found that there was not. A 
fourth factor is the relationship between federal and state govern-
ments under the Constitution. A federal court should not interfere 
unless violation of the right is clear.304 The test to be applied, con-
cluded the court, is "the sum of all these factors." The application 
of that sum appeared to the court to point to two conclusions: 
first, "a unit system for use in a party primary is invidiously dis-
criminatory if any unit has less than its share to the nearest whole 
number proportionate to population, or to the whole of the vote 
in a recent party gubernatorial primary or to the whole vote for 
electors of the party in a recent presidential election"; and second, 
"no discrimination is deemed to be invidious under the system if 
the disparity against any county is not in excess of the disparity 
that exists against any state in the most recent electoral college 
allocation, or under the equal proportions formula for representa-
tion of the several states in the Congress, . . . provided it is ad-
justed to accord with changes in the basis at least once each ten 
years."305 The court indicated that it was aware of the fact that 
it might be thought doctrinaire thus to state "definite standards," 
and said that it did so, "because, and only because, it is a question 
of much public moment." 
So after the Supreme Court refused four times to invalidate a 
unit system with top-to-bottom variation of over one hundred to 
one, the district court has held that thirteen to one is "afoul" the 
301 Sanders v. Gray, supra note 300, at 168. 
302 Ibid. Compare with this test that espoused by the district court in Baker v. 
Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962), where it was said that the right violated was 
a right not to be treated differently from citizens in the "irrationally favored counties." 
Id. at 344. 
303 335 U.S. 281 (1948). 
304 Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 168-69 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (for later history, see 
note 300 supra]. 
aor; Id. at 170. 
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Constitution. The case is presently on appeal to the Supreme 
Court and will offer a test of the revolutionary character of the 
Baker decision. Plainly the district court found no irrationality 
other than what it found to be an unfair differential. Like the dis-
trict court in Tennessee in the Baker case on remand, it fixed the 
limits of fairness within very narrow tolerances. In Baker, the 
outer range of reasonableness was placed at a two-thirds fraction 
rule. The Georgia district court was willing to go along with a 
major fraction rule. 
The second of the Georgia cases, Toombs v. Fortson,306 tested 
the apportionment of the state legislature. The Georgia constitu-
tion, like that in New York, provides for legislative apportionment 
of the lower house according to a formula protecting the repre-
sentation of smaller counties. The difference is, however, that the 
Georgia house of representatives has 205 members and there are 
159 counties. The formula allots to the eight largest counties three 
representatives apiece, to the thirty next largest, two, and one each 
to the remaining 121 counties. This results in a difference of ratio 
of roughly one hundred to one. 
Not only is the Georgia case distinguishable on the ground of 
order of difference, but, unlike New York, Georgia had appor-
tioned the senate without regard to population. The senate dis-
tricts were in all but two cases groups of three counties, with each 
district electing one senator. In all but two cases the law forbade 
a senator to succeed himself or be succeeded by a resident of the 
same county. Instead, each of the three counties in a district was 
entitled to have one of its residents in the senate in every third 
session. This was accomplished by holding the primary election 
only in the county whose turn it was, though, in the general elec-
tion, voting was throughout the district. Since senate districts were 
each composed of the same number of counties, the rural bias in 
the senate is substantially the same as it is in the house of repre-
sentatives. Under the rotation system, counties due to have a 
senator in the state's twenty-eight least populous districts, al-
though representing only 6.13 percent of the state's population, 
would elect a majority of the fifty-four member senate. 
Following the same "sum" of tests employed in Sanders v. 
Gray, the court held that the rotation system of electing senators 
was unconstitutional, and that a representative system which does 
not elect at least one house by population involved "invidious dis-
crimination" under the equal protection clause. Whether or not 
306 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962). 
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one house could be apportioned on a purely geographical basis 
it did not feel obligated to say.307 
As in Tennessee, relief proved to be a problem. During the 
pendency of the Sanders case, the governor had called a special 
session of the legislature and it had taken action on the unit 
system. It had adjourned, however, without doing anything about 
legislative apportionment. In its original opinion, written by 
Judge Tuttle, and filed on May 25, 1962, the court indicated that 
it would postpone further proceedings "until the State has had 
a reasonable opportunity to reconstitute the Legislature so as to 
meet the constitutional standards here laid down prior to the 
January, 1963, session."308 In mid-July nothing had been done to 
correct the abuses pointed out by the court, and it rendered a 
second opinion to clarify the first. 309 This opinion, delivered by 
Judge Bell, and joined in by Judge Morgan, limited the effect of 
the first opinion to a declaration of the invalidity of the rotation 
system in the senate and the unconstitutionality of a system in 
which neither house is apportioned by population, with an indica-
tion that if nothing is done to achieve a system in conformity with 
those standards by January 1963, the court would have a duty to 
take such action as would be necessary to afford plaintiffs their 
rights. The court did not decide, said Judge Bell, that the legis-
lature would not have any legal status after January. On the con-
trary, "its present status will continue until changed."310 Judge 
Tuttle dissented from this clarifying opinion. He indicated that 
what the court intended to say and, so far as he knew, still intends 
to say, is that "unless at least one House of the Georgia Legislature 
is reconstituted so as to represent the people of the State accord-
ing to population by January I, 1963, no legally constituted Legis-
lature of the State of Georgia will then be in existence or there-
after be in existence."311 
Just what method of reapportionment could be resorted to 
after January I, 1963, Judge Tuttle does not explain. Presumably 
he was of the opinion that, after the seven-month period of grace, 
the court would in some fashion act directly "to accord plaintiffs 
their rights." This threat was one which Judge Tuttle had delivered 
from the bench. On his invitation to express contrary views, his 
307 Ibid. 
308 Id. at 259. 
300 Toombs v. Fortson, Civil No. 7883, N.D. Ga., July 13, 1962 (memorandum opinion 
filed with order). 
310 Id. at 2. 
311 Id. at 3. 
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brothers Bell and Morgan had expressed none, and Judge Tuttle 
shows some pique at their later disassociation from his view of 
the matter. His position is strange, inasmuch as one would expect 
that in a case in which relief is one of the major problems, the 
court would not act to limit the avenues of possible action until 
it was forced to. The presence of a sitting legislature, for example, 
widens the possibilities for equitable pressures. Perhaps Judge 
Tuttle thought that the present threat of chaos in January would 
effect action and that the court's failure to back up its threat would 
encourage foot-dragging.312 
The third volume in the Georgia trilogy is Wesberry v. Van-
diver.313 This case rounded out the effort to test the application 
of Baker v. Carr314 to all the types of apportionment sustained 
in the thirty years of litigation preceding the Baker case. It was 
filed to challenge the constitutionality of the Georgia congressional 
apportionment, raising again the same issues which were before 
the Supreme Court in Wood v. Broom315 and Colegrove v. Green.316 
First the court applied to congressional apportionment the 
test it had worked out in the unit rule and legislative apportion-
ment cases. It pointed out that the act in question was enacted in 
1931, following the loss by Georgia of two seats in the House of 
Representatives. Though the districts created by that act varied 
in population from a high of 396,112 to a low of 218,496, the 
court could not say that it thought the plan at that time arbitrary. 
It stated that the 1931 act created districts which "reflected a 
rational state policy to set up the congressional districts in Georgia 
with some reasonable relation to population." It continued to 
say that "on the other hand it now reflects a system which has be-
come arbitrary through inaction when considered in the light of 
the present population of the Fifth District and as measured by 
any conceivable reasonable standard."317 
In the congressional situation, however, the court felt that 
judicial intervention should await the passing of a reasonable time 
to allow "normal state governmental processes" to correct the 
312 On September 27, 1962, the Governor of Georgia called the legislature into 
extraordinary session, and, on October 5, 1962, the legislature enacted legislation re-
apportioning the state senate. Under the scheme there adopted, urban counties are 
given twenty-three of the fifty-four seats in the senate, with twelve allotted to metro-
politan Atlanta. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT IN 
THE STATES (1962 & Supp. I, 1963). 
313 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962). 
314 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
315 287 U.S. 1 (1932). 
316 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
317 Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276,282 (N.D. Ga. 1962). 
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alleged abuses. Tested by the fourteenth amendment and article 
I, section 2, rights of the plaintiffs, the court suggested that it 
would decline to find invidiousness at the present time, but would 
retain jurisdiction until a reasonable time had been afforded a 
reapportioned General Assembly to reapportion congressional 
seats.318 
The court did not do this, however, for it read the Colegrove 
case as bringing into the congressional apportionment problem 
the role of Congress. Colegrove, as applied to congressional ap-
portionment, the court took to be binding. It was cited as 
authority in cases in which there was only "state action," and per-
haps, in view of Baker v. Carr, is no longer binding in such cases. 
In the area of congressional apportionment, however, the court 
did not take Baker v. Carr to repudiate its holding, particularly 
since it was expressly preserved in the previous term in Gomillion 
v. Lightfoot.319 In view of these considerations, the court felt that 
the complaint should be dismissed for want of equity "to the ex-
tent that no cognizable constitutional claim is presented under the 
facts and subsisting authorities."320 
Judge Tuttle disagreed with the majority in their view that 
Colegrove v. Green was preserved in Baker v. Carr. He would have 
denied relief on the ground that political remedies were avail-
able through a reapportioned legislature, but would have retained 
jurisdiction over the cause in order to grant relief if political 
processes should prove unavailing. 321 
B. Sims v. Frink: 
The Alabama Do-It-Yourself Apportionment Kit 
The Alabama apportionment situation was closely analogous 
to that in Tennessee. The state constitution provided for legis-
lative apportionment according to population. As in Tennessee, 
the last Alabama reapportionment had taken place in 190 I. In 
Sims v. Frink322 a suit was brought before a three-judge court to 
reap the rewards promised by Baker v. Carr. The court took as 
conceded that the apportionment in both house and senate under 
the 1901 act embodied invidious discrimination. The General 
Assembly was called into extraordinary session to forestall judi-
cial intervention and adopted two pieces of legislation. The first 
318 Ibid. 
310 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
320 Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276, 286 (N.D. Ga. 1962). 
321 Ibid. 
322 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962). 
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was a temporary or "stand-by" legislative apportionment act alle-
viating to some extent the "glaring discrepancies."323 The second 
was a proposed constitutional amendment which would create a 
senate of sixty-seven members, one from each of the sixty-seven 
counties in the state.324 The house, on the other hand, would be 
apportioned on the basis of population. Since the proposed 
amendment to the constitution of Alabama further required that 
in distributing representatives by population every county should 
be given at least one representative, the court read the proposal 
as providing less than mathematical proportion to population. 
It went on to say that, although there had been some suggestions 
in the district court cases since Baker v. Carr that a system in 
which the apportionment of one house is based on population 
and the other is based on geography might meet muster, where 
the detailed provisions of the local constitution, as in Alabama, 
make exact apportionment by population impossible in either 
house, the result may well be to require at least some attention 
to population in both.325 In view of the detailed requirements of 
the proposed constitutional amendment, making exact propor-
tion impossible in the house, it ruled that the proposal for a one 
county-one senator senate would be unconstitutional. The pro-
posal for distribution of the seats in the house it felt was within 
constitutional limits, however. 
The stand-by statute was declared unconstitutional in that its 
provisions for the distribution of house seats embodied invidious 
discrimination, and, further, that it was to take effect only after 
November, when the people were to vote on the proposed con-
stitutional amendment. The court seemed to feel that since it 
had declared that the acts proposing the amendments were un-
constitutional, an act to take effect after the date set for their 
submission would be unconstitutional as a needless delay in 
affording the plaintiffs their constitutional rights.326 
Having declared the stand-by act and the act proposing the 
constitutional amendment unconstitutional, the court was left 
with no governing provisions at all. It thereupon simply issued 
an order adopting its own apportionment plan to be effective 
323 Alabama House Bill 59, Extraordinary Session, 1962, known as "Crawford-Webb 
Act." The text of the act is reproduced as appendix C to the court's opinion; see Sims 
v. Frink, supra note 322, at 445. 
324 Alabama Senate Bill 29, Extraordinary Session, 1962, known as "67 Senator 
Amendment." The text of the proposed amendment is set out as appendix B to the 
court's opinion; see Sims v. Frink, supra note 322, at 443. 
325 Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. at 439. 
326 Id. at 441. 
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immediately, but subject to the power of the present legislature 
to supersede it with legislation enacted before the next elections.327 
The court took the stand-by act provision for senate apportion-
ment and the plan embodied in the proposed constitutional 
amendment for apportionment of the house of representatives, 
and incorporated them in its order. Thus a federal court has 
declared half of a state constitutional amendment unconstitu-
tional before it was adopted, and adopted the other half for the 
people of the state before it was voted on. 
The court did not take the system it adopted to be a full 
measure of absence of invidiousness. It quoted from Mr. Justice 
Clark's Baker opinion to the effect that perhaps the courts could 
correct some of the egregious discrepancies and thereby break 
the stranglehold. Jurisdiction was retained for the purpose of ex-
amining the action of the next legislature in adopting a permanent 
system consistent with constitutional principles. To add insult 
to injury, costs were taxed to the defendants.328 
C. Moss v. Burkhart 
Moss v. Burkhart329 was an action brought to force the Okla-
homa legislature to apportion in consonance with Baker v. Carr. 
The case was, as was stated by the district court, a sequel to 
Radford v. Gary.330 The alleged discrepancy between ratios of 
representatives to those represented was approximately ten to 
one. It will be remembered that in Radford the relief sought had 
been mandamus to the governor to call the legislature, to the 
legislature to reapportion, and, failing that, to the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma to do it for them. Mr. Justice Brennan had dis-
tinguished the case from that in Baker as controlled by "prob-
lems of relief." In Moss v. Burkhart the plaintiffs requested that 
the court "proceed to enjoin the State Auditor, State Treasurer, 
and Members of the Oklahoma Tax Commission from taking any 
official actions on appropriations or enactments of those claim-
ing to exercise legislative authority."331 They added, however, 
that if they be mistaken in the remedy sought, they be granted 
such remedy as would relieve and cure the evils from which they 
continued to suffer. 
The Governor of Oklahoma appeared voluntarily and testi-
327 Id. at 442. 
328 Perhaps under a theory of quantum meruit. 
320 207 F. Supp. 885 (W .D. Okla. 1962). 
sao Id. at 887. 
sa1 Ibid. 
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fied to the effect that he was elected governor on a program to 
reapportion the legislature, had recommended reapportionment 
according to the constitutional mandate, and had sponsored an 
initiative petition to effect reapportionment, but that it had been 
defeated at the polls, and further that he had appeared as a 
defendant and as an amicus curiae in cases before the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, had suggested modes of relief to that court, and 
had offered to convene the legislature in special session if the 
court would indicate its disposition to afford relief in the event 
the legislature failed to act. This offer he repeated to the 
federal district court in Moss. The court refused interlocutory 
relief to give the legislature an opportunity to act. After hearing, 
the court declared the Oklahoma constitutional provision limit-
ing the number of legislators from one county to seven to be 
null and void, and that the present apportionment statute was 
also null and void, but made this ruling prospectively, with 
effect upon "all future elections."332 
This ruling was handed down June 19, 1962, and the case 
was continued to July 31, 1962, presumably to give the legis-
lature an opportunity to act. When the court reconvened the 
legislature had not acted. There was before it a motion to alter or 
amend the decree and for a consideration of various remedies. The 
motion was overruled, except that, by way of clarification of the 
earlier order, the court said that it had not meant to indicate 
that a general assembly elected in the November 6, 1962, elec-
tion would not be legally constituted. Since the filing period for 
the 1962 election had already begun when the interlocutory decree 
was rendered, it would not be considered a "future election."333 
It then proceeded to set down "guidelines" for the 1963 
session of the legislature. First, the state was to be apportioned 
on a basis of substantial numerical equality, to the end that each 
voter shall have approximately the same power and influence 
in the election of members of the two houses. This, said Judge 
Murrah, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the Okla-
homa constitution and the equal protection clause. He did not 
say whether he read them separately or together. Second, the 
house of representatives shall be apportioned according to the 
requirements of the Oklahoma constitution, except that the 
seven-member limit shall not be followed, it being found and 
declared unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment; the 
332 Id. at 898. 
333 Ibid. 
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said seven-seat limit being removed, Oklahoma and Tulsa coun-
ties are to have nineteen and fourteen legislative seats, respectively. 
Third, the senate shall be apportioned according to the provi-
sions of the Oklahoma constitution, except that, there being two 
irreconcilable provisions therein, the court will prefer the one 
which provides for exact equality. It then proceeded to allot the 
proper portion to the single-county districts and state that the rest 
shall be coupled in the way which will give them as nearly as pos-
sible equal population, and compactness and contiguity.334 
On the surface, Judge Murrah's opinion seems to indicate that 
it is the court's duty not only to force apportionment consistent 
with the fourteenth amendment, but to require a full observance 
of the provisions of the Oklahoma constitution as well. The fact 
that he found the seven-member limit unconstitutional, however, 
may indicate that he believed the Baker case to require absolute 
numerical equality. This does not necessarily follow, for he may 
be of the opinion that the seven-member limit fails to meet the 
test of the equal protection clause, and, with the offending clause 
being struck from the Oklahoma constitution, that instrument 
requires absolute uniformity in both houses. In view of the in-
sistence of the majority of the Baker Court that it was not being 
called upon to enforce provisions of the state constitution, Judge 
Murrah's position is a strange one. It does have the advantage of 
providing a standard, however. If he is holding that absolute 
equality is required in both houses, certainly his opinion is not 
even consistent with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas 
in his concurring opinion in Baker v. Carr. 
Like the district court in Tennessee, Judge Murrah and his 
brethren are left at "ducks and drakes" until the Summer of 1963. 
He suggested that if there is no acceptable legislative apportion-
ment statute forthcoming, he will proceed to direct methods. 
D. Sobel v. Adams 
The Florida apportionment was further from being propor-
tional to population than most, a member of the lower house 
from Gilchrist County representing 2,868 voters, and one from 
Dade County, 311,000, a difference of over one hundred to one. 
The suit was brought in the United States district court and heard 
by a three-judge panel. The court had little trouble in coming 
to the conclusion that the apportionment of the house of repre-
sentatives was in violation of the Constitution of the United States. 
334 Id. at 898-99. 
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It also indicated that it considered that proposed constitutional 
amendments would be unconstitutional, but declined to enjoin 
their submission. Finally, it declared the house apportionment 
act "null, void, and prospectively inoperative," and continued the 
case until August 13, 1962.335 The following day the governor 
called the legislature into extraordinary session, and it withdrew 
the proposed amendments and substituted one which provided a 
scheme for the house of representatives under which each county 
would have one representative and the remainder would be ap-
portioned according to population. The senate would be com-
posed of forty-six districts, each district to elect one senator. Each 
of the twenty-four most populous counties would constitute a 
district, and the other twenty-two districts would be composed 
from the remaining forty-three counties.336 To implement the 
provisions of the proposed constitutional amendment, the legisla-
ture enacted two statutes, one making an apportionment of the 
house of representatives in accordance with the formula set out 
in the proposed amendment, 337 and the other making provision 
for senatorial districts of the number specified by the same amend-
ment. 338 
The court, per Judge Jones, held that, if the amendment is 
adopted in November 1962, the state will have provided for a 
rational system of apportionment.339 Judge Jones rejected the 
suggestion that the equal protection clause required precise nu-
merical equality in districts in either house of the legislature. In 
the house of representatives he felt it perfectly rational to preserve 
minimum geographical representation by requiring that each 
county have at least one representative. The senate districts, he 
suggested, might seem at first to be a crazy quilt but on closer 
examination to follow overall rational lines. He laid emphasis upon 
the fact that the Florida legislature enacts a great deal of local 
legislation and for that reason it was sensible to have no more 
than three counties to a single senator. The case was continued 
with the statement that, if the amendment is ratified, the cause 
will be moot and will be dismissed. 
335 Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316, 318 (S.D. Fla. 1962). 
336 Fla. Legis., H.R.J. Res. 30-X, Ex. Sess. (1962), found in FLA. STAT. ANN. art. 7, 
§§ 1-6 (1962); see Sobel v. Adams, supra note 335, at 319. 
337 See Sobel v. Adams, supra note 335, at 319. 
338 Id. at 320. 
339 On November 6, 1962, this proposed amendment was rejected at the polls. 
Thereupon the governor issued a call for a special session of the legislature. The session 
convened on November 9 and sat until November 27. No apportionment legislation was 
adopted, but a special study committee was formed to make recommendations to the 
new general assembly when it convenes in regular session on April 8, 1963. 
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E. Lisco v. McNichols 
This case involved a suit to enjoin enforcement of the Colorado 
legislative apportionment statutes.340 It was brought against the 
governor of the state, the state treasurer, and the General Assem-
bly. They answered, challenged the jurisdiction of the court, and 
asserted their immunity from suit. The court found that it did 
have jurisdiction and that the suit was not against the state. It 
found, further, that the present Colorado apportionment did not 
meet with the requirements of the equal protection clause, that 
is to say that it is characterized by invidious discrimination against 
those living in districts with a large population. The court noted, 
however, that the primary election was scheduled for September 
11-it then being August I 0-and that the case had been tried 
in less than two days, affording no opportunity to explore various 
modes of relief. Under the circumstances, the court felt that it 
should grant no injunction but should stay action until an in-
definite date in the future, giving the 1963 legislature an oppor-
tunity to act. 
VII. THE STATE COURT CASES 
The role of the state courts in the efforts to keep apportion-
ment plans current has often been commented upon. Suffice it 
to say that none of the Supreme Court cases announcing the non-
justiciability rule or holding against the existence of federal rights 
in any way limited or defined the state courts' powers to grant 
relief to correct abuses under the state constitutions. It has 
already been pointed out that in Illinois the state supreme court 
enjoined the expenditure of state funds in the holding of an elec-
tion under an invalid apportionment statute.341 Other state courts 
have fashioned other modes of relief.342 Many of the state courts, 
however, have followed the course of the Supreme Court in its 
refusal to intervene.343 This refusal generally has been grounded 
on the absence of power to grant relief, since in many instances 
the violation of the state constitution has been too plain for argu-
mentation. The question raised by the Baker case with respect 
to these decisions is whether the announcement that an invidious 
discrimination based upon residence of the voter constitutes a 
violation of the federal constitution has the effect of conferring 
340 Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1962). 
341 See Moran v. Bowley, 374 Ill. 148, 179 N.E. 526 (1932). 
342 See, e.g., Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960). 
343 See generally SEARS, METHODS OF REAPPORTIONMENT (1952). 
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jurisdiction on state courts to deal with their legislatures in a 
way in which they had previously decided was ultra vires. If the 
effect of the Baker decision is to confer such jurisdiction, a second 
problem remains. If the state court may now act to require con-
formance to the minimal standards of the equal protection clause, 
may it take as its gauge of fairness the provisions of the state con-
stitution where those provisions are more strict than those required 
by the equal protection clause? 
The problem is touched upon in Stein v. General Assembly,344 
a case brought in the state courts in Colorado after the Supreme 
Court decision in Baker v. Carr. In the Stein case a suit was 
brought in the Supreme Court of Colorado seeking a prerogative 
or remedial writ: first, ordering the General Assembly to convene 
for the purpose of reapportioning the seats in the legislature; sec-
ond, requiring the governor to convene the legislature for such 
purpose; third, prohibiting the secretary of state from "permitting 
the conduct of elections or certifying to office any person as elected 
to the General Assembly until there be such reapportionment ... "; 
and fourth, prohibiting the state treasurer from paying to any 
member of the General Assembly any of the emoluments of his 
office until there be reapportionment as provided by the constitu-
tion of Colorado. The gravamen of the Stein case is the failure of 
the Colorado legislature to reapportion the state under the require-
ments of the constitution of Colorado. The constitutional provision 
required apportionment based upon population, and its validity 
was not at issue. The Colorado legislature was last apportioned 
in 1953. The constitution provided that apportionment should 
take place in 1885, "and every tenth year thereafter; and at the 
session next following such enumeration, and also at the session 
following an enumeration made by the authority of the United 
States .... "345 The complaint stated that the governor had certi-
fied the census figures to the legislature in 1961, and in 1962, 
and at both sessions the legislature had failed to act. Between 
1950 and 1960, Colorado had increased its population by 32.4 
percent, urban population increasing by 55.5 percent, while rural 
population showed a decline of 6.6 percent. As a result, it was 
urged, there existed in 1962 an unconstitutional irrational prefer-
ence for urban voters. Justice Day, speaking for three members of 
the seven-man court, began by saying that it should be made clear 
that the Supreme Court of Colorado could not and would not 
344 374 P .2d 66 (Colo. 1962). 
345 CoLO. CoNST. art. V, § 45. 
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order the governor to do anything, "the doing of which lies within 
his sound discretion," and further that the court was of the opinion 
that the calling of special sessions of the legislature was such a 
prerogative. It went on to say in like fashion that the court could 
not grant the relief sought against either the state treasurer or the 
secretary of state. Justice Day thought, however, that the fact that 
the plaintiff might have misconceived his remedy would not divest 
the court of jurisdiction.346 On the merits, the court held that the 
state constitution required apportionment during the odd-num-
bered year following the census so that on the facts the legislature 
was not as yet derelict in its duty. It stated, however, that the 
apportionment was discriminatory and retained jurisdiction. 
There were two dissents, each of interest, but for different 
reasons. On the subject of state court remedies, Justice Hall, 
noting the requested relief, was of the opinion that the court, 
having come to the conclusion that none of the majority was ready 
to afford any of the remedies sought, should dismiss the suit. 347 
He considered all of them to be beyond the powers delegated to 
the judiciary. Since he felt that the majority had in effect held 
that the time for legislative action had not arrived, it was unbe-
coming of the court to retain jurisdiction, and those persons 
charged with constitutional and statutory duties "are entitled to 
go about [their] performance ... untrammelled by threats or 
warnings from this court, no matter how hollow or impotent they 
may be." Justice Moore, on the other hand, saw a violation of 
the Constitution of the United States under the Baker doctrine, 
and believed that whenever such a violation is shown to exist, it 
is not within the power of the state to postpone correction because 
of any variety of "state action."348 This view of the matter appears 
to suggest that decennial apportionment requirements themselves 
cannot be justified as reasonable where great shifts take place in 
a shorter time, a view which is in sharp contrast to the view of 
the federal district court in New York which suggested that the 
provision of the law of that state calling for a vote every twenty 
years on whether a constitutional convention shall be held estab-
lished a political corrective to be weighed in determining whether 
or not a court should intervene. 
On the subject of jurisdiction, the Colorado court had no 
doubts, but it may be doubted that this was the result of Baker v. 
346 374 P.2d 66, 67 (Colo. 1962). 
347 Id. at 81. 
348 Id. at 73. 
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Carr, for as early as 1934 it had taken jurisdiction to test the va-
lidity of apportionment legislation, holding the act of that year 
unconstitutional. 
These same doubts about power to afford equitable relief are 
to be seen in Sweeney v. Notte,349 in Rhode Island. There a suit 
was brought to challenge the validity of a legislative apportion-
ment of the Rhode Island house of representatives under a con-
stitutional provision requiring that at least one representative be 
given to each of the municipalities in the state. The legislature of 
Rhode Island, like that of Colorado, had failed to reapportion on 
the basis of the 1960 census. The court found that discrepancies 
in representation ratio were as great as four to one. It also found, 
however, that there was no way to achieve equal apportionment 
in the house of representatives consistent with the provisions of 
the constitution requiring representation of the municipalities and 
limiting the number of seats to one hundred.350 It was troubled 
by the possibility that it might declare that the General Assembly 
had a duty to apportion under the existing provisions, only to find 
out later that these requirements violate the United States Con-
stitution. It took the bit in its teeth and held that strict adherence 
to both the municipality representation and the one hundred-
member limit would make a constitutionally valid apportionment 
impossible, but declined to direct the General Assembly as to 
which it should follow. As to relief, the court said: 
"In the absence of constitutional warrant to the contrary this 
court has no authority to require the general assembly to 
meet in special session, nor to require the governor to exer-
cise his constitutional prerogative to call such a session. Fur-
thermore, we are not persuaded that our obligation to resolve 
the justiciable issues herein considered is so broad as to re-
quire us to hold that the superior court would be warranted 
in supervising reapportionment of the house of representa-
tives. . . .''351 
It stated further that it felt obligated to say that if the legislature 
349 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962). 
350 This view was repeated in Opinion to the Governor, 183 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1962). 
The constitutional provision in question required 1% representation of the state's 
thirty-nine municipalities. The court gave its opinion that there was no way of con-
forming to this provision and to the 100-member limit while satisfying the requirements 
of the equal protecton clause. The best that could be done under the provision would 
result in a minimum difference in ratio of between four to one and twenty-two to one, 
"which in our opinion would be so unjustly discriminatory as to be invidious." Id. at 
807. 
351 183 A.2d 296, 303 (1962). 
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did not reapportion the state, some federal court would probably 
do it for them. 
Justice Roberts concurred in an opinion in which he said 
that he thought the court had gone pretty far in considering the 
provisions of the state constitution. He thought the proper func-
tion of the court was to declare the legislature's duty to reappor-
tion under the constitutional mandate and leave the validity of 
that provision for later litigation.352 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although the reactions have varied from huzzahs to Minie 
balls, this generation has learned to live with a Supreme Court 
which has defined its function as including reform as well as en-
forcement of the community's standard of minimum fair treat-
ment. At the very least it can be expected that the concept of 
fairness will change over the years, and we are accustomed to 
having such changes reflected in a shifting construction of the 
constitutional phrases "due process" and "equal protection." 
There is nothing very revolutionary, then, in finding that the 
Court will inquire into allegations of arbitrary discrimination 
based upon a person's place of residence. Nor is there much that 
is surprising in a holding that this will be so in cases dealing with 
matters of franchise; the fifteenth amendment cases have schooled 
us to think it normal for courts to interfere in such matters. 
The United States, like other nations around the world, has 
found no answer to the question, "How 'ya gonna keep 'em down 
on the farm?," and mid-twentieth century finds us primarily an 
urban nation. It is not surprising, then, that the Court should 
investigate such discrimination at the instance of urban dwellers, 
constituting, as they do, some sixty-nine percent of the population, 
well-organized, and loud. Matters of constitutional right are ruled 
no doubt partly by pity, but partly by noise. 
The most disturbing feature of the apportionment cases is the 
fact that beneath the surface of every one of these cases, and not 
very far beneath at that, lies a partisan political struggle. There is 
no doubt that from first to last these cases have been brought 
to challenge the validity of a system which accords concentrated 
urban populations less representation than they would receive 
were representatives allotted on the basis of population alone. 
352 Id. at 304. Justice Roberts stated: "The courts of this state, in my opinion, 
are without power, inherent or conferred, to apportion the house of representatives 
either directly or indirectly by resort to the equity jurisdiction." Ibid. 
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The problem has never been one of whimsical or irrational allo-
cation, or discrimination against individuals because they live at 
a particular intersection between meridian and parallel. The resi-
dents of Memphis care not at all whether Moore County, Tennes-
see, is given a single representative or coupled in a fioterial district 
with Coffee County, unless perhaps they think that one solution 
or another will make it more probable that the district will return 
a member of the Memphis political stamp. The contest is not 
between people living in one area or another; it is between Demo-
crats and Republicans. 
Courts are themselves frequently in need of protection from 
partisan politics, and for this reason traditionally they have kept 
out of partisan struggles. They have said to the politician, ''I'll 
stay out of your arena, and you keep your gladiators out of my 
court room." This has not always been so, and in some states we 
still retain political elections of judges, but in the federal judicial 
system this detachment from politics has been thought of as an 
aid in maintaining an honest, impartial, and independent judicial 
establishment. A political judicial branch will be politically 
curbed, and should be. As long as we view courts as arbiters of 
disputes between individuals, and protectors of individuals against 
oppression by the state, it is sensible to want judges of fair mind 
and independence. When courts undertake to manipulate and 
control the processes for selection of the politician, what is more 
natural than for the politician to marshal his resources for con-
trolling the selection of the judge? It is true, of course, that po-
litical connections are not at the present time an inconsiderable 
feature of judicial appointment; it is not, however, a feature 
which most thinking people wish to see grow. 
A second disturbing feature of judicial embroilment in matters 
of this sort is the absence of any ready yardstick for measuring the 
right asserted. It is all very well to stand ready to protect citizens 
from clear abuses of rights or, as Mr. Justice Clark says, from the 
operation of systems without any logical justification. Since in 
representation geography is obviously a secondary device, under 
which there is an untold number of political alignments and cross-
alignments fitted together by bargain, it is in a rare case, indeed, 
that, by standing aside and looking at the system, one can tell 
whether it is a "crazy quilt" or an authentic "action painting." 
The experience thus far with the district court decisions ap-
plying the Baker case illustrates the problem. There have been 
almost as many views of what equal treatment is as there have 
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been courts which have considered the matter, and frequently 
the members of a single court have had widely diverging views. 
As one would suspect, they cluster around three positions. The 
first, consonant with the views already expressed here, is that 
mere difference is not enough, and that, where the court can think 
of possible benign motives for the differences, it should not inter-
fere. A second position is that substantially equal representation 
of geographical units according to population is required in one 
house of the legislature, but geographical representation without 
regard to population may be employed in the other. The third 
position is that representation in both houses must be governed 
by standards of equal representation, insofar as it is possible to 
achieve equality among the geographical areas forming the units 
for representation. Because of the disruption these cases have 
threatened, many states have proceeded to try to meet the re-
quirements laid down, without waiting for final determination by 
the Supreme Court of the standards to be employed. In some 
quarters this may appear to be a victory for intervention, since 
it avoids the problems of affording any positive relief. It may be, 
however, that in some cases systems of representation perfectly 
consonant with the equal protection clause, as the subject right 
will evolve through subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court, 
will have been given up and, because of the shifts in power re-
sulting from the changes forced under threat by the courts, will 
be irretrievable. The new system may, of course, be better--or 
worse. In either case, it is difficult to agree with the propriety 
of effecting such changes through judicial duress. 
The third criticism which may be warranted goes to judicial 
method. Though the bar and the public are conditioned to change 
in the definition of constitutional rights, the judgment of courts 
is entitled to respect largely because we view it as the product of 
wisdom and reason. The Court is the agency which interprets 
our history and tradition in light of present circumstances. Though 
presumptions run against it, cases may arise in which a long series 
of decisions, proceeding from an original faulty premise, have for 
many years perpetuated a condition which the Court thinks anti-
thetical to our true tradition. If the Court were ready to say that 
the apportionment cases are of this sort, it could have said so. 
Instead, it tortured the precedents beyond recognition and, with-
out giving any guiding principles, invited the district courts to 
entertain the welter of suits it must have anticipated-and on 
the eve of primary elections in many states. In a nation with fast-
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growing urban populations, the substance and effect of the Court's 
action will probably be popular, though ultimately it may com-
plicate its existence and in the long run endanger its independence. 
Its method, however, was more crafty than craftsmanlike, and can-
not add to the prestige that comes from a reputation for honest 
reading of the past coupled with sound and considered judgment 
in applying past to present. 
The manner of disposing of Baker, Scholle, and Simon, and 
the spate of cases which Baker has brought, makes it certain that 
the Court will have early and ample opportunity to attack the 
task of framing guiding principles. It is to be hoped that it will 
not be ducked by a dozen years of per curiam decisions citing 
Baker v. Carr and, further, that the advantages of simplicity will 
not prompt adoption of a standard of mathematical equality based 
solely upon population, thus ending centuries of experimentation 
with the design of democratic institutions which will accommo-
date within the same unit of government a wide variety of interest 
groups without subjecting all to absolute domination by a close 
majority which is geographically concentrated and highly organ-
ized. 
